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Skill, Job Design, and the Labor Market under Uncertainty
Abstract
The labor market matches agents with work, but uncertainty over the type and loca-
tion of available work reduces the eciency with which skill can be allocated to its best use.
The essays in this dissertation examine the impact of uncertainty on the optimal division of
work into jobs and allocation of agents to those jobs using applied economic theory.
The rst and second essays focus on the tradeo between allocating agents in the
market (contracting) versus in the rm (employment). Contractors are mobile allowing for
a more ecient match between agent skill and task value, but employees are available for
tasks that contractors cannot do. In the rst essay, two aspects of volatility, urgency and
uncertainty, are traded o; urgency requires putting resources in place but at the cost of
mobility. The equilibrium divides the labor market into employees and contractors, with the
number of employees increasing in urgency and decreasing in uncertainty.
Essay two explores the instability of contract work for agents of dierent skill levels.
It describes an equilibrium, reecting ndings from sociology, in which low skill contractors
are excluded from employee positions and face greater instability than high skill contractors.
The model shows that such an equilibrium is likely to arise when rms have a low volume
of work, tasks require little rm specic knowledge, or labor supply is low relative to the
number of possible employee positions.
The third essay discusses the impact of uncertainty on the horizontal division of labor
under gains from specialization. It presents a model of team and job design in which the set
of tasks required for production is uncertain and the amount of work available is limited.
iiiThe assignment of agents to tasks is constrained by the work available, implying naturally
arising limits to team size and specialization. Division of labor can be increased by increasing
team size, but this is costly as it reduces agent utilization.
All three essays demonstrate that uncertainty increases the value of agent mobility,
either between rms or between tasks. Thus, optimal job design and skill allocation are such
that specialization is decreasing in uncertainty.
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viiPreface
Markets and organizations are two ways of allocating resources, including skill, in the econ-
omy. An ecient allocation matches each resource to its best use. However, uncertainty
makes allocation dicult, because the best use for a resource may not be known in advance.
This dissertation explores the impact of uncertainty on the allocation of talent to rms and
to jobs in the labor market.
A main theme throughout these essays is that uncertainty increases the value of
mobility. Because the best use for an agent's skill is unknown in advance, delaying the
commitment of that agent to a particular rm or task has the potential to increase match
eciency. It is clear, then, that as uncertainty increases, specialization of any kind decreases.
The essays presented here discuss several types of specialization: temporal specicity,
rm specic knowledge, and area of expertise. Mobility is traded o with preparedness
when tasks may be urgent, with performance on rm specic tasks, or with gains from
specialization. In all three cases, the results of the model demonstrate that changes in stang
patterns and job design can be attributed to changes in the predictability of workow.
The rst and second essays focus on the tradeo between allocating agents in the
market (contracting) versus in the rm (employment). Contractors are mobile allowing for a
more ecient match between agents who dier in skill and tasks that dier in value; however,
employees are available for tasks that contractors cannot do.
This argument demonstrates that economy wide trends in stang practices, such as
employment and independent contracting, must be examined from the labor market level.
The value of mobility cannot be captured in a transaction level model. Thus, these two
viiiessays, rather than examining a rm's stang decision as previous papers have done, analyze
the entire labor market and identify which agents become employees and which become
contractors.
In the rst essay, uncertainty is traded o with another aspect of volatility: urgency.
Urgency requires putting resources in place, which is at odds with the mobility necessitated
by uncertainty. The equilibrium divides the labor market into employees who are allocated
to respond to urgency and contractors who remain mobile.
While employees take on any urgent task that needs to be done, contractors' skills are
eciently matched with task value. Thus, an employee's rm assignment is specialized but
his job is general, whereas a contractor's rm assignment is general but his job is specialized.
The results of the model show that the number of employees is increasing in urgency and
decreasing in uncertainty, and job specialization is decreasing in urgency and decreasing in
uncertainty.
The second essay explores the emergence of two classes of contract workers, reported
by sociologists. It describes an equilibrium, reecting the ndings from sociology, in which
low skill contractors are excluded from employee positions and face greater instability than
high skill contractors. The model shows that such an equilibrium is likely to arise when
rms have a low volume of work, tasks require little rm specic knowledge, or labor supply
is low relative to the number of rms.
These two essays reveal a link between the changing nature of production and working
patterns of agents. An increase in the use of independent contracting, a decrease in vertical
specialization, and an emergence of a class of contingent workers facing low wages and
unemployment can all be explained by a decrease in the predictability of available work.
ixIndeed, work has become less predictable in economies where service and technology sectors
are growing while manufacturing is shrinking.
The third essay expands on this idea by examining the impact of uncertainty on the
horizontal division of labor. Theorists and practitioners have touted the benets of divi-
sion of labor and renement of jobs in manufacturing for centuries. However, production
in manufacturing is uncommon in its consistency and predictability. Instead, many indus-
tries can be characterized by workow that cannot be controlled like an assembly line can.
Furthermore, the types of tasks required for production are often uncertain.
The assignment of agents to specic task types is constrained by the work available
at a given time. Thus, the nal essay shows that team size and specialization are naturally
limited when the quantity of work is limited. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the value
of moving agents between a variety of task types (i.e. decreasing division of labor) increases
when the tasks required for production are not known in advance. Division of labor can be
increased by increasing team size, but this is costly as it reduces agent utilization.
The theories presented in this dissertation relate labor market patterns, such as
stang practices, job design, and talent allocation, to characteristics of the labor market
and the nature of production and workows. The results of these models can be used to
predict the fraction of agents who are contractors, the degree of job specialization, and job
stability in dierent industries. Future work will take these predictions to data in order to
test and rene the models.
In addition, these essays take the labor supply as given. The next step for this
research is to extend the models to examine implications for agent skill investment choices,
in particular when agents face tournament-like competition.
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xiChapter 1
Employees and Contractors: The Role of
Volatility in the Labor Market
1.1 Introduction
Urgency and uncertainty present challenges to matching agents with jobs. Where should
agents be placed when there is uncertainty over the location of important tasks? How can
agents be eciently placed when there is a limited supply of talent and urgency requires that
tasks be done immediately? This paper argues that employment and contracting can arise
as solutions to allocation frictions. Employees are agents who are allocated locally to tasks,
allowing for responsiveness to urgency. Whereas, contractors are agents allocated globally,
allowing uncertainty to be addressed in the labor market.
In this general equilibrium model, with symmetric information, complete contracts,
and no moral hazard, production occurs when an agent applies his skill to complete a task,
which may take on a number of values. Thus, agents and tasks must be matched, and likeother matching models, social surplus is maximized by allocating the highest skill agents to
the highest value tasks, i.e. through assortative matching.
This match cannot generally be achieved because agents are hired by rms, rather
than allocated directly to tasks. Uncertainty over which rms will receive high value tasks,
together with the urgency of tasks, creates friction in matching agents with tasks. An agent
may be allocated after uncertainty is resolved, thereby increasing the eciency of his match;
however, delaying agent allocation is costly because it causes urgent tasks to go undone. The
tradeo between urgency and uncertainty aects the eciency of production, the nature of
employment relationships, and the degree of division of labor in the economy.
The timing of agent allocation reaches a stable equilibrium in which some agents
are allocated to rms ex-ante each period while others are allocated ex-post each period.
Interpreting agents who are allocated ex-ante as employees and those allocated ex-post as
contractors, employment is increasing in urgency and decreasing in uncertainty in the general
equilibrium. Employment is also increasing in the supply of high skill labor. The model
further predicts that the division of labor is highest when urgency is low and uncertainty is
low.
The results of the model support the employment versus contracting interpretation
of allocation timing. An agent who is hired before uncertainty is resolved does a subset of
the tasks his rm receives. Thus, the job of this agent is a function of the rm to which
he is assigned. This result aligns with casual observation, which suggests that the dening
characteristic of an employee is that he works for a single rm over an indenite period. An
employee's job is dened by the rm he works for; it depends on the tasks the rm needs to
be done.
2The model shows that agents who are allocated after information revelation have
higher skill utilization because they are able to spread their talent across a variety of rms.
An agent who is hired ex-post specializes in a particular type of task, and can work at any
one of a number of rms, as long as that rm has the correct task type. This description
reects real world working patterns of contractors who are typically hired for specic projects
or periods of time. Contractors work for many rms, or clients, and therefore have the
exibility to specialize in a particular type of task. The rm a contractor works for depends
on his job specialization.
The equilibrium also describes three rm stang policies. In the rst policy, the rm
hires a high skill agent as an employee. A rm using this policy will have the employee
perform any task it receives. In the second policy, the rm hires a low skill agent as an
employee. This employee works only on some task types, as the rm will also hire a high
skill contractor after it receives a high value, non-urgent task. Lastly, in the third policy, a
rm does not hire an employee, but hires a contractor depending on the task type it receives.
The question of when a rm should hire an agent as an employee rather than as
an independent contractor is basic to organizational economics, having rst been posed by
Coase in his 1937 paper that founded the eld. The literature on this topic focuses on
the role of employees and independent contractors relative to the rm, rather than their
role in the economy as a whole. Allocation of authority to the rm has been proposed as
the dening characteristic of employment (Coase, 1937; Simon, 1951; Williamson, 1971).
Authority is relevant when a choice cannot be specied in the contract in advance, i.e. when
there is uncertainty and contracts are incomplete (Williamson, 1971). This paper presents
3an alternative to the existing theory of employment that is not based on incomplete contracts
and incentive issues.
The existing theory argues that when uncertainty over the state of the world is high,
making exibility important, hiring an employee to execute the decision is better than hiring
a contractor because the rm can exercise its authority over the employee (Williamson,
1971, 1975; Tadelis and Williamson, 2013). If this were the case, increased environmental
volatility would lead to an increase in traditional employment relationships. In fact, in many
industries, the observed phenomenon is the opposite: companies cite exibility as a reason
for hiring contractors and temporary workers. The model in this paper uses a dierent type
of uncertainty, that over task type, to provide an alternative theory for agents as employees
and contractors which accounts for these observations.
The issue of whether and why rms have authority over agent actions is under debate.
Some argue that relationship specic investments make at least one of the parties better o
transacting with its contractual partner than with another party in the market (Klein et al.,
1978). When an investment is made in an asset that is used in production, asset ownership
determines which party can take the asset if the relationship breaks down, and therefore
directly aects the parties' options. When a rm owns an asset, its ability to replace an
agent gives it authority over the agent's actions (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
The asset-ownership theory makes strong predictions regarding stang decisions
when physical capital is an essential factor, but does not explain stang when non-human
assets are less important, such as in service industries. For example, the provision of legal
services to a single corporate client does not rely on an asset that is owned by the client when
the lawyers are in-house employees and owned by the law rm when the lawyers are out-
4side counsel. This example indicates that factors other than authority contribute to stang
decisions.
The model in this paper sets aside both incomplete contracting and incentive issues.
As such, it is similar in approach to the team theory literature, which focuses on the structure
of organizations (Garicano and Van Zandt, 2013). While this literature does discuss trade-
os with respect to delay (Van Zandt, 2003, 1998; Radner, 1993), specialization (Bolton and
Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000), and exibility through use of local information (Gari-
cano and Van Zandt, 2013), it does not directly address the employment versus contracting
problem.
This paper is most closely related to the knowledge hierarchies literature, which argues
that a high skill agent's time is leveraged by working with low skill agents so he can focus only
on tasks others are unable to do (Garicano, 2000). That result is similar to the specialization
result in the current paper; however, specialization here is the job of contractors who can
be either low or high skill. The result in this paper that contractors are specialists is in line
with the argument elsewhere that specialization is supported by market size (Garicano and
Hubbard, 2008); here agents can specialize by oering their skills in the open labor market,
which is a larger market than a single rm. In this paper, delay allows for a distinction
between agents who are located together and those who are located separately. Thus, this
approach is complementary to knowledge hierarchies, in which agents in the same hierarchy
may be in the same or dierent rms.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briey outlines a real world example
of the model. Section 1.3 introduces the variables of interest and sets up the model. The
equilibrium allocation of agents is derived in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 introduces the results
5regarding jobs and how they dier by agent type and by assignment timing. Section 1.6 de-
scribes the equilibrium stang practices of rms and discusses which types of rms use each
stang policy. Section 1.7 explores the impact of uncertainty and urgency on employment
and job design. Section 1.8 concludes. All proofs of results are provided in the appendix.
1.2 Example: Corporate Lawyers
As the model is introduced, it will be helpful to refer to a real world example. Corporate law
is an industry in which the agents, lawyers, use their skill to work on tasks. Tasks can dier
greatly in value. For example, corporate legal transactions and lawsuits can range from tens
of thousands of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, agents of dierent
skill levels perform dierentially on similar tasks. The legal profession comprises a broad
range of talent, which is assortatively matched with work; a labor market with lawyers as
independent contractors allows for talent to be eectively matched with cases throughout
the economy.
In the eld of corporate law, some cases are handled by in-house counsel and some
by outside lawyers. Legal scholars seeking to explain the rise of in-house counsel have cited
rm specic knowledge as an important benet of using in-house counsel (Lynch, 1979;
Machlowitz, 1989; Aibel, 1983; McKinney, 1979), as well as continuity of knowledge (Aibel,
1983; McKinney, 1979) and faster action (Chayes and Chayes, 1985; Machlowitz, 1989; Aibel,
1983; Hackett, 2002). Some have also suggested that in-house counsel has a unique ability to
play a preventative role (Lynch, 1979; Chayes and Chayes, 1985; Aibel, 1983; Hackett, 2002).
Alternatively, the cited benets of hiring outside counsel include utilizing specialization
6(Chayes and Chayes, 1985; Aibel, 1983) and cost saving of only hiring counsel when needed
(Machlowitz, 1989; Aibel, 1983).
The theory presented here encompasses these arguments. Agents who are allocated
ex-ante (employees) use the time before tasks arrive to gain knowledge about the rm.
Agents who are allocated ex-post (contractors) must catch up, causing a delay that is costly.
An ex-post allocated agent, however, is matched with the rm where his skill can be best
utilized.
1.3 Model Setup
In an economy where agents use their skill to produce value by completing tasks, suppose
there are two types of agent, high skill and low skill, and two values of task that a rm may
receive, high value and low value. Frictions arise in the match due to three problems: 1)
There is uncertainty over which rms will receive high value tasks; 2) Agents must prepare
before working at a rm, and this preparation takes time; and 3) Some tasks are urgent, so
delayed matches will cause a loss of value due to the preparation time.
Working on a task requires preparation which is rm, rather than task, specic. As
such, the preparation can be done before the task arrives, but preparation for one rm is not
helpful for work at a dierent rm. For example, a lawyer working on a case for a corporation
must have an understanding of the corporation's business environment, recent actions it has
taken, and the laws and regulations under which it operates. Assume this preparation must
be done each time an agent works; agents must keep up with recent rm decisions.
7new 
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Figure 1.1: Task Arrival and Preparation-Work Patterns
At time t, each rm receives a task, and the type of each rm's task is publicly
revealed. Assume that preparation takes half a period, and that while preparing, an agent
cannot also be working on a task. Then, in order for an agent to begin working on a task
when it arrives, he must be matched with a rm at t   1
2. If, on the other hand, an agent
is not matched until the tasks arrive, he will not begin working on a task until t + 1
2. Of
all tasks, ^  are urgent, expiring before t + 1
2. The rest of tasks are non-urgent, expiring
at the end of one period. Working on a task takes half a period, so the time required for
preparation and work is one period.
Each task can be attempted only once; if an agent fails in completing the task, there
is no opportunity to attempt the task again. Figure 1.1 shows the timeline, indicating the
timing of preparation and of work relative to task arrival. At each rm, the task will either
be attempted in the rst half of the period by an agent who prepared in the half-period
before arrival (Pattern 1), or attempted in the second half of the period by an agent who
prepared in the rst half of the period (Pattern 2).
8Each rm will receive a task of value v 2 fv;  vg, where v <  v. This value is in-
dependent of task urgency. There are two types of agent,  and  , where  denotes the
probability that the agent will successfully complete the task he attempts (otherwise no
revenue is generated), and  <  . Each agent's type is public information.
These types can be thought of as lower and higher skill agents, where higher skill
agents have an absolute advantage in production. In the example, while all lawyers are
highly skilled workers, there is variation within the eld; some are elite and some are average.
In the model,   and  will be referred to as `high' and `low' skill respectively for simplicity;
the relative, not absolute, skill levels of these agent types drive the results of the model.
The fraction of tasks that are high value is ^ p < 1
2, but there is uncertainty over which
rms will receive these tasks. All rms are assumed to be ex-ante identical, unless otherwise
indicated. For expositional purposes, suppose the fraction of agents who are high skill is
equal to the fraction of tasks that are high value; this assumption will be relaxed, and the
eect of high skill labor supply analyzed, in Section 1.7. Assume there are as many agents
as there are tasks.
1.4 Optimal Agent Allocation
In a multi-period model, there is a tradeo between ensuring that urgent tasks are done
and allowing agents to be eciently matched with tasks by allocating them ex-post, because
ex-post allocated agents cannot work on urgent tasks the subsequent period. This section
examines the eect of urgency costs of ex-post assignment. First, a model in which tasks
9arrive in each of two periods is presented, allowing for the detailed examination of this
tradeo. Then the implications of extending the model are discussed.
In a nite model, there is no opportunity cost to assigning each agent ex-ante of the
rst batch arrival of tasks. Each period agents may be reallocated after being allocated
ex-ante. Reallocated agents move into the ex-post role in the economy, continuing to work
on available eciently matched non-urgent tasks. The number of agent who are reallocated
is limited either by the urgency costs or by the limited supply of non-urgent tasks. Thus,
the system will always reach a steady state in which no ex-ante allocated agent is reallocated
ex-post.
1.4.1 Three Period Equilibrium Allocation
Suppose the economy lasts for three periods. Specically, time begins at the start of Period
0. At the beginning of Period 1, each rm receives a task. Some of these tasks are urgent
and expire half way through Period 1, and the rest expire at the end of the period. At the
beginning of Period 2, each rm receives a second task, which may or may not be urgent, as
in Period 1. The timeline is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Note that ex-ante allocation of an agent for Period 1 does not prevent ex-post real-
location. An agent can prepare to work at a rm before Period 1 begins, and immediately
begin preparing to work at a dierent rm at the start of Period 1. Each agent will be
allocated to a rm for preparation in Period 0.
Each agent allocated to a rm ex-ante has some probability of being ineciently
matched with a task. Some high skill agents' rms will receive low value tasks, and some
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Figure 1.2: Timeline with Tasks Arriving Twice
low skill agents' rms will receive high value tasks. Period 1 surplus may be increased by
reassigning some of these agents, but doing so will have an eect on Period 2 surplus. The
equilibrium allocation of agents maximizes total surplus, balancing the costs and benets of
ex-post reallocation.
Under the assumption that the fraction of agents who are high skill is equal to the
fraction of tasks that are high value, the fraction of agents who are high skill with non-urgent,
low value tasks equals the fraction of agents who are low skill with non-urgent, high value
tasks.
As such, Period 1 surplus is highest when all non-urgent tasks are eciently matched
with agents: high skill agents do all non-urgent, high value tasks; low skill agents do all
non-urgent, low value tasks. Each urgent task is done by the agent allocated to its rm
ex-ante, because reallocating these agents will decrease surplus. Figure 1.3 shows the match,
including ex-post reassignment, that maximizes Period 1 surplus.
While reallocation of mismatched agents in a given period increases surplus from work
on that period's tasks, it has a negative impact on surplus in the following period. Working
during the second half of Period 1 prevents an agent from preparing during that time to
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Figure 1.3: Period 1 Match with Ex-post Reallocation
work during the rst half of Period 2; therefore, reassigned agents cannot work on urgent
tasks in Period 2.
On the other hand, the surplus generated by work on non-urgent tasks in Period 2
cannot decrease as a result of Period 1 reassignment of agents. Reassignment during Period
2, the last period, is not costly; it does not prevent work on future urgent tasks, because
there are no future tasks. Therefore, all non-urgent, high value tasks are done by high skill
agents in Period 2.
If no agents are reassigned in Period 1, then in Period 2 all non-urgent, low value
tasks are done by low skill agents after Period 2 reallocation (see Figure 1.3). However, if
any agents are reassigned in Period 1, some non-urgent, low value tasks will be done by
high skill agents in Period 2 (as shown in Figure 1.4). Each high skill agent not assigned
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Figure 1.4: Period 2 Match with Ex-ante Unassigned Agents and Ex-post Reallocation
ex-ante for Period 2 (because he was reassigned ex-post in Period 1) will work on a non-
urgent, high value task. This allocation decreases the demand for reassignment of Period 2
ex-ante allocated high skill agents from low value to non-urgent, high value tasks. Thus, the
surplus generated by work on non-urgent, low value tasks in Period 2 is increasing in Period
1 reassignment|more non-urgent, low value tasks are done by high skill agents.
When the immediate surplus gain and the future gain on non-urgent, low value tasks
exceeds the cost from urgent tasks going undone, all agents will be reassigned in Period 1.
Note that the future costs are direct, resulting from the unavailability of a Period 1 reassigned
agent to work on urgent tasks in Period 2. The potential future benet comes from a change
in the allocation of other agents, specically high skill agents allocated ex-ante for Period 2
to low value tasks who then are not reassigned.
13The immediate benet to reassigning a high skill agent to a non-urgent, high value
task is:
(    ) v    v
For each high skill agent that is reassigned, allocating the low skill agent left idle by that
reassignment to the non-urgent, low value task left open by that reassignment increases
surplus by:
v
Each reassigned agent will not work on urgent tasks in Period 2. Thus conditions1 for
reassignment to be ecient are as follows.
Condition 1.
v > [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] (a)
(    )( v   v) > (  + )[^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] (b)
These conditions hold when  is low relative to  , when v is low relative to  v and
when ^  is very low. In other words, they hold when the dierences between high skill and low
skill and high value and low value make allocative eciency important, and when urgency
is very low so that the cost of increasing allocative eciency is low.
1These conditions are slightly stronger than necessary as the increase in surplus on Period 2 non-urgent
tasks would decrease the right hand sides of these inequalities. However, even if the weaker condition fails,
the condition that the number of agents and the number of rms is identical is required for no reassignment
to occur. For a larger number of rms, some urgent tasks will not be done regardless of ex-ante assignment.
Therefore the cost of reassigning an agent ex-post falls. For a larger number of agents than rms, reassignment
does not imply that urgent tasks aren't done as the extra agents can be assigned to the rms that are left
open.
14Proposition 1. Under Condition 1 all mismatched agents with non-urgent tasks are reas-
signed in Period 1.
Agents who are assigned or reassigned ex-post increase allocative eciency. Their role
in the economy is to create a better agent to task match. The role of agents who are assigned
ex-ante is to mitigate the costs of urgency by being prepared for newly arriving tasks. In
this nite model, agents who are reassigned in a period are moving from the ex-ante role to
the ex-post role.
1.4.2 Extended Horizon
Suppose that instead of three periods, the economy lasts n periods, and the future is dis-
counted with discount factor . During each period for which surplus can be increased by
rematching agents ex-post, agents will be rematched.
Proposition 2. If the economy lasts for n periods, then for all v satisfying Condition 1,
there is a  such that:
During each period, any ex-ante assigned agents that can be reassigned for an imme-
diate surplus increase will be.
As fewer high skill agents are allocated ex-ante, more non-urgent, high value tasks
will be available for ex-post reassignment. Thus, each period more agents are reassigned
until the number of high skill agents in the ex-post role equals the number of non-urgent,
high value tasks at rms that are not assigned a high skill agent ex-ante (see Figure 1.5).
As the time horizon goes to innity, allocation of agents will approach this steady state.
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Figure 1.5: Steady State Agent Allocaiton
In this case, after matching unassigned high skill agents with non-urgent tasks ex-
post, there are no more non-urgent, high value tasks. Thus, reassigning a high skill agent
whose ex-ante assigned rm receives a low value task cannot increase surplus, because there
are no high value tasks that he can be reassigned to.
The next two sections describe the behavior of agents and rms in the steady state
of this equilibrium allocation. Then the comparative statics of the steady state equilibrium
are explored.
161.5 Agent Jobs: Employees and Contractors
An agent's skill level and the timing of his allocation determine the tasks he will attempt.
In equilibrium, an agent who is allocated ex-ante will exhibit characteristics typically as-
sociated with employees|his productivity will be a function of the rm to which he is
assigned. An agent who is allocated ex-post will have characteristics typically associated
with contractors|he will always work on a particular type of task, which requires that his
skill be spread across many rms.
In the steady state equilibrium, ex-post allocated agents must move between rms, as
each rm has a probability less than one of receiving the same task type in the next period.
Contractors move throughout the economy, applying their skill to tasks at dierent rms.
Employees add value because they are available to do tasks as they arrive; they
reduce the costs from urgency in the economy. There is no eect on surplus from ex-ante
allocated agents moving between rms after they have worked on one task and before they
begin preparing for the next. While these agents can move between rms, doing so has no
aect on surplus. Movement of employees during a steady state equilibrium cannot, then,
be explained by allocative eciency.
High skill agents are assumed to have an absolute advantage, which makes them more
productive. In the equilibrium, high skill agents are also more productive because they are
assigned to higher productivity jobs, ones consisting of higher expected value of the tasks.
There is an additional dierentiation in productivity between contractors and employees of
each skill level because of specialization.
171.5.1 High Skill Contractor's Job
A high skill contractor adds value in the economy by working on a high value task received
by a rm which was allocated a low skill employee or no employee ex-ante. This allows these
agents to maximize their productivity and increases the output of rms that cannot hire a
high skill agent as an employee.
High skill agents who are allocated ex-post do only high value tasks. Working on a
high value task is more productive than working on a task of uncertain value. Thus, high
skill contractors are the most productive agents in the economy2.
Observation. High skill agents allocated ex-post work on non-urgent, high value tasks with
probability 1. They are the most productive agents in the economy, having the highest expected
output.
Once a high skill agent becomes a contractor, there will always be a high value task
for him to work on. However, no individual rm will receive such a task with certainty.
Therefore, this agent's skill must be spread across several rms; in the steady state, over
time he will necessarily work for multiple rms, even when each rm's probability of receiving
a high value task is constant. A high skill contractor's talent is used eciently because he
does not spend time on low value tasks.
2Relaxing the assumption that there are at least as many high skill agents as there are non-urgent,
high value tasks, this model shows that the highest skill agents in the economy become contractors, never
employees.
181.5.2 High Skill Employee's Job
A high skill agent allocated ex-ante does any task type his rm receives. Because his skill
cannot be utilized more eciently elsewhere, high skill employees spend some of their time
working on low value tasks. This makes them less productive than high skill contractors.
Observation. In the steady state, a high skill agent allocated ex-ante attempts any task that
his rm receives.
The expected performance of a high skill agent allocated ex-ante is
 [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
In an economy with rms that dier in p, the assignment of a high skill agent to a particular
rm will determine the makeup of that agent's job. A high skill employee works on a high
value task with probability p, and a low value task with probability (1 p), where p may be
rm dependent. Thus, the rm an ex-ante allocated high skill agent works for determines
his job|the tasks he works on.
1.5.3 Low Skill Employee's Job
Low skill agents allocated ex-ante have the same role in the economy as their high skill
counterparts. A low skill employee works on whatever his rm needs done. In the steady-
state equilibrium, a low skill agent who is allocated ex-ante will do any task his rm receives
except for non-urgent, high value tasks, which are left for high skill agents to do.
19Observation. A low skill agent allocated ex-ante does the low value and urgent tasks that
his rm receives.
The expected value produced each period by a low skill agent allocated ex-ante is:
[^ p^  v + (1   ^ p)v]
The low skill employee works on a high value task with probability p and a low value
task with probability (1  p), and has a p(1 ) of being idle. Like the high skill employee,
his job is a function his rm.
That the low skill agent allocated ex-ante spends some time idle opens the possibility
that some low skill agents can be less productive than low skill agents allocated ex-post, who
only work on low value tasks.
Condition 2. More value is generated by an agent who spends all his time on a low value
task, than by an agent who works on a rm's urgent and low value tasks, but is idle when
the rm receives a non-urgent high value tasks.
v  ^ p^  v + (1   ^ p)v
Under this condition, the low skill employee is the least productive agent in this
economy.
201.5.4 Low Skill Contractor's Job
Low skill agents allocated ex-post provide value by ensuring no non-urgent tasks remain
unassigned. A low skill agent who is allocated ex-post must work on a low value task, because
all non-urgent, high value tasks allocated ex-post are matched with high skill agents.
Observation. Low skill agents allocated ex-post do only non-urgent, low value tasks.
As a contractor, the agent specializes in a particular type of task; low skill contractors
work only on low value tasks. Like the high skill contractor, the low skill contractor must
have a large number of potential clients, which collectively have enough tasks to support the
agent working full time on this particular type of task.
The results presented thus far reveal the working patterns of agents in this economy.
Each agent does a job that depends on his type and on the timing of his allocation. High skill
agents always work on tasks with higher expected value than the tasks low skill agents work
on. Agents assigned to a rm ex-ante do a greater variety of tasks than their counterparts
allocated ex-post, and high and low skill agents allocated ex-ante have over-lapping jobs.
1.6 Firm Stang: The Use of Employees and Contrac-
tors
The stang practices of rms in this economy balance the cost of uncertainty with the cost
of urgency. Firms can choose to sta for exibility, allowing them to tailor hires to the task
at hand. Alternatively, they can sta for preparedness, having an agent ready, even if that
agent may not be best-suited for the task.
21In the steady-state equilibrium there are three stang policies, with resulting job
design implications, used in this economy.
Observation. In the steady-state equilibrium, rms have one of three employment policies
in this economy:
1. Hire high skill agent ex-ante; he does any task.
2. Hire low skill agent ex-ante; he does any low value or urgent task. Hire high skill agent
ex-post for non-urgent, high value task.
3. Hire no agent ex-ante; if task is non-urgent hire high skill agent for high value task,
low skill agent for low value task ex-post.
The tradeos of the rm are clear when one considers the market wages that support
this equilibrium. The performance of a rm that hires a high skill agent is always higher
than that of a rm hiring a low skill or no agent ex-ante. However, the high skill agent
ex-ante will have a higher market wage. A low skill worker is paid less, but must be paid
even when he does not work. Hiring no agent reduces the wages that must be paid, but also
increases the risk that the rm's task will go undone.
1.6.1 Stang for Flexibility: Firms Dier in Probability of High
Value Task
When rms dier in ex-ante probability of receiving a high value task, the ex-ante assignment
of an agent to a particular rm has an eect on surplus. High skill agents' advantage in
22productivity is higher for a higher expected value task. Thus, for all rms that are allocated
agents ex-ante, rms with the highest p must be allocated high skill agents.
Lemma 1. Under Condition 2, any ex-ante matches must be assortative, with the highest p
rm allocated a high skill agent and the lowest p rm allocated a low skill agent.
As some agents are only allocated ex-post, some rms are not allocated an agent ex-
ante. The types of rms that are not allocated an agent ex-ante depend on where assigned
agents can be most productive. High skill agents allocated ex-ante will produce
 [p v + (1   p)v]
This value is increasing in p. Thus, high skill agents must work at the highest p value rms.
Similarly, low skill agents allocated ex-ante to a rm of type p produce
[p^  v + (1   p)v]
which is decreasing in p due to Assumption 2. Because a low skill employee is idle when his
rm receives a non-urgent high value task, his talent is better utilized at rms with a higher
probability of a low value task.
Firms that benet the most from having exibility in stang, those whose task type
is least certain, are the ones that will hire agents as contractors (ex-post). Firms that have
more certainty in their task type will hire employees, low skill for those with a low probability
of a high value task and high skill for those with a high probability of a high value task (see
Figure 1.6).
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Figure 1.6: Ex-ante Agent Allocation by Firm's Probability of High Value Task
Observation. Under Condition 2, in the steady state equilibrium, the rm types using each
stang policy are as follows:
1. Firms with the highest p hire high skill agents ex-ante, who do any task.
2. Firms with mid-range p, hire no agent ex-ante, if task non-urgent hire ex-post: high
skill for high value, low skill for low value.
3. Firms with low p, hire low skill ex-ante, for low value and urgent tasks. Hire high skill
ex-post for non-urgent high value tasks.
1.7 Comparative Statics: Trends in Stang
The characteristics of the economy determine the steady state that optimal skill allocation
reaches. Factors such as urgency, uncertainty, and high skill labor supply have an impact on
the equilibrium size of the labor market for contractors, the division of labor, the rm types
that are unassigned ex-ante, and the level and inequality of agent wages.
241.7.1 Size of Contractor Labor Market
The fraction of agents who become contractors is a response to demand for ex-post allocative
eciency. As urgency increases, the quantity of tasks available for reassignment, non-urgent
tasks, decreases. Therefore, the ex-post demand for agents decreases and fewer agents be-
come contractors. More workers will be hired as employees (ex-ante), so that fewer tasks are
left undone.
Proposition 3. The quantities of high and low skill agents who become contractors (are
hired ex-post) is decreasing in urgency.
Uncertainty has the opposite eect on the equilibrium quantity of contractors; there
are more contractors when uncertainty increases. When uncertainty is high, few rms have
a very high probability or a very low probability of receiving a high value task. The rms
assigned a high skill agent ex-ante receive fewer non-urgent, high value tasks. Therefore,
there are more non-urgent, high value tasks elsewhere for high skill agents to be reassigned
to. As the quantity of high skill contractors goes up, the need for low skill contractors
increases as well, because there are more rms that are not assigned agents ex-ante with
non-urgent, low value tasks that can be done by ex-post assigned low skill agents.
Proposition 4. The quantities of high and low skill agents who become contractors (are
hired ex-post) is increasing in uncertainty.
Having more contractors in the economy increases the exibility to eciently match
skill with tasks. When the relationship between assignment to a rm and to a particular
type of task decreases, the value of contracting will increase.
25Allocative eciency is particularly dicult when high skill labor is in short supply.
In this case, there are fewer agents to work on relatively more high value tasks. As the
quantity of high skill agents increases, excess agents will become employees because demand
for contractors is already satised. Furthermore, when more high skill agents are allocated
ex-ante, the demand for high skill contractors goes down. Thus, the fraction of agents who
are high skill contractors decreases as the fraction of agents who are high skill increases,
which further decreases the fraction of agents who are low skill contractors.
Proposition 5. The quantity of high skill contractors is decreasing in high skill labor supply.
For ex-ante identical rms, the quantity of low skill contractors is decreasing in high skill
labor supply.
Contracting is thus decreasing in urgency, increasing in uncertainty, and decreasing
in high skill labor supply.
1.7.2 The Division of Labor
The degree of division of labor in the economy can also be measured. While contractors
will always be eciently matched, uncertainty increases the probability that an employee is
mismatched. The degree of job overlap (the probability with which high skill agents do low
value tasks and low skill agents do high value tasks) depends on how much division of labor
there is for employees and on how many agents become employees.
While contractors are specialists working on only eciently matched tasks, employees
are not. Low skill employees work on urgent, high value tasks, and high skill employees
work on urgent and non-urgent, low value tasks. Contractors of both types continue to be
26eciently matched with high skill agents working only on high value tasks and low skill
agents working only on low value tasks. Thus, if more agents are employees, the division of
labor is lower.
As urgency increases the fraction of agents who become employees is increasing, and
therefore, the division of labor is decreasing.
Proposition 6. As urgency increases, division of labor decreases.
Similarly, as high skill labor supply is increasing, employment is increasing, causing
the division of labor to fall.
Proposition 7. As high skill labor supply increases, division of labor decreases, when rms
are ex-ante identical.
Finally, uncertainty pushes toward the use of contractors, who are assortatively
matched. However, increasing the number of contractors cannot overcome the decrease in
division of labor due to employees being mismatched. Therefore, the following result holds.
Proposition 8. The division of labor is decreasing in uncertainty.
1.7.3 Wages
In the market equilibrium, each agent and rm will agree to the equilibrium employment
policies. Because each type of agent can work as either an employee or a contractor, the
wage of each skill level must be constant over allocation timing. If the wage of high skill
employees is higher than the wage of high skill contractors, then there will be excess supply
of high skill agents in the employment labor market and under supply of high skill agents in
27the contracting labor market. The wage of high skill contractors will then be driven up and
the wage of high skill employees driven down until they are equal.
In taking a position at a rm, an agent forgoes the option of working at another rm;
thus the agent prepares for the rm and is paid whether he works or not3. Therefore, when
rms are deciding whether to wait and hire a contractor or to hire a low skill employee, they
weigh the cost of not having urgent tasks done with the cost of paying the low skill employee,
even if a non-urgent, high value tasks arrives and that agent sits idle.
The market clearing wages in an economy with ex-ante identical rms are such that
rms must be indierent between hiring a high skill agent, low skill agent, and no agent
ex-ante. The dierence between low skill and high skill wages is due in large part to the
dierences in skill levels of the agents. However, there is also an allocative eect from
work done by contractors. The dierence in productivity of contractors exceeds their skill
dierential because high skill agents are also allocated to high value tasks and low skill agents
to low value tasks.
When rms dier in their ex-ante probability of receiving a high value task, the
market clearing wages for this economy will sort each ex-ante allocated agent to his highest
productivity assignment. Whereas ex-ante identical rms are indierent between the three
stang policies, in the case of ex-ante heterogeneous rms only the rm type at the boundary
between stang policies will be indierent.
3Contracts are complete, and all agents and rms are risk neutral, so this assumption is equivalent to
agents being paid a higher wage only when they work.
28Thus, the p value of the rm that determines the wage for high skill agents is larger
when rms are ex-ante dierent than when they are identical. The p value for the rm that
determines the wage for low skill agents is smaller when rms are ex-ante dierent.
1.8 Conclusion
The use of agents in non-employment roles has risen dramatically over the past fty years.
Given that agents in these roles have become a signicant fraction of the labor force, un-
derstanding the forces driving this change is essential. Contractors provide the exibility
necessary for eciently allocating talent to tasks in an economy full of uncertainty. The
benet of reserving agents as contractors is limited by urgency, because contractors cannot
be in place as tasks arrive.
The model in this paper explores the tradeo between uncertainty and urgency and
produces stang patterns that closely match the dening characteristics of employees and
contractors. Employees are agents who work for a single rm; their jobs are loosely dened
and depend on the rm that they work for. Contractors are specialists whose jobs are well
dened; whether a contractor will work for a particular rm depends on whether that rm
has a task that corresponds with that contractor's job. Furthermore, each contractor is able
to sustain this specialization and high level of output relative to employee-agents of the same
type because he spreads his skill over many rms.
In many industries, use of outside contractors and temporary workers has increased.
Executives explaining these choices cite the importance of workforce exibility. On the other
hand, the industry of corporate law has been moving in-house. To explain this seemingly
29opposite trend, legal scholars appeal to urgency and responsiveness. Over the past 40 years,
the profession of in-house corporate counsel has risen in prominence. First, the number of
lawyers working as in-house counsel has grown (Lynch, 1979; Hackett, 2002; Machlowitz,
1989; Liggio, 2002). Second, while most corporations that employ in-house counsel also use
outside counsel, the proportion of a corporation's legal work done in-house has grown (Liggio,
2002; Lynch, 1979)|indeed, for a small number of rms virtually all legal work is performed
by in-house counsel (Lynch, 1979; Machlowitz, 1989; Liggio, 2002). Finally, perhaps as a
result of these two trends, the reputation of in-house counsel has also risen (Liggio, 2002;
Lynch, 1979; Machlowitz, 1989).
The phenomenon of increased reliance on in-house legal counsel is consistent with the
results of this model. Corporate law departments range from full service shops to minimally
staed oces that direct work to outside counsel. Firms in between these two poles often
retain full responsibility for some areas of legal practice in-house, while delegating all other
legal tasks to outside counsel (Liggio, 2002). Liggio's description of the various types of
corporate in-house legal practices and his assertion that when outside counsel is hired, it
is chosen specically for a particular task mirror the model's three stang policy results
described in this paper.
The results of the model reect seemingly opposing hiring trends in the real world.
Popular explanations for this dichotomy match the predictions of the model. In many
industries, rms have increased their reliance on contractors, consultants, and temporary
workers in response to economic uncertainty. On the other hand, the eld of corporate in-
house counsel has experienced signicant growth due to increased urgency and demand for
responsiveness.
30Previous theories of employment emphasize authority and relationship specic in-
vestments. These theories oer important insights into those industries where production
is dependent on non-human capital. However, in human capital dominant industries, the
model provided here represents the stylized facts in employment and contracting, providing
new insight into the value of these roles in the economy.
31Chapter 2
Talent Allocation and the Inequality of
Contingent Workers
2.1 Introduction
The experiences of agents in their working lives are changing as the nature of employment
relationships evolves. Careers are increasingly moving beyond rm boundaries, and as a
result, the stability and security of agents' work has become a concern for policy makers
and scholars, in addition to the agents themselves. Sociologists, in particular, have noted a
relationship between non-standard work relationships and employment instability, especially
for low skill agents who are excluded from standard employment. However, economic models
of the labor market focus on overall supply side outcomes or demand side concerns rather
than the experiences of agents in these changing markets.
This paper presents a theory of the labor market that allows for the examination of
agent experience depending on skill level and on type of employment: as an employee or as
a contractor. It characterizes the market equilibrium that reects the instability discussedby sociologists, and identies conditions under which such an equilibrium is likely to arise.
Specically, the equilibrium of interest is one in which low skill contractors cycle in and out
of unemployment and are unable to move to more stable standard employment positions.
The model is a matching model with no asymmetric information or moral hazard.
Agents of dierent skill levels produce output by working on tasks of dierent values. Rather
than being directly matched with a task, each agent is matched with a rm whose task value
is uncertain ex-ante. Each agent can be matched as an employee ex-ante, as a contractor
ex-post, or not be matched at all, in which case he is unemployed.
In the leading case, illustrating the evidence from sociology, the optimal match is
such that the lowest skill agents in the economy do not become employees because their skill
is not competitive for the available positions. Instead, these agents remain unallocated until
task types are revealed. In some states they are contractors, while in other states they are
unemployed. On the demand side of the labor market, this equilibrium requires that some
rms do not hire an employee, so low skill contractors must be more productive than they
would be as employees at those rms.
This type of equilibrium is likely to arise when labor supply is relatively limited, so
that agents are more productive when spreading their skill across many rms. Similarly,
when rms have a small volume of work, contractors can be more productive than employees
because they are likely to be matched with a task at one of many rms. Finally, when there
are few tasks that can only be done by employees (i.e. in industries where knowledge or skill
is general rather than rm specic), the equilibrium is likely to t this allocation pattern.
Some have noted the role of regulation on the increased use of non-traditional em-
ployment relationships (for example, Kalleberg (2000)). Limits to a rm's ability to dismiss
33employees (Autor, 2003) and minimum employee benets requirements (Houseman, 2000)
have both been suggested as potentially contributing to the trend. In addition to examining
conditions for which the unregulated equilibrium includes low skill contingent workers, the
eects of these two types of regulation are explored.
The model reects several theories regarding rms' choices over stang arrangements.
Sociologists and economists alike have argued that contractors may be used in order to reduce
costs (Abraham and Taylor, 1996), to exibly sta in response to volatility (Abraham and
Taylor, 1996; Kalleberg et al., 2003), or to utilize skill not available in-house (Abraham and
Taylor, 1996; Matusik and Hill, 1998). All of these forces are at work in the model presented
here.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section gives a very brief overview of the
evidence on the contingent workforce from the sociology literature and outlines the facts this
theory seeks to explain. Section 2.3 introduces the model, explains how agents are allocated,
and gives some general conditions on optimal allocations. In Section 2.4 the equilibrium
of interest is characterized, and in Section 2.5 the other two possible equilibrium types are
characterized. Section 2.6 gives conditions under which the leading case is likely to arise.
Section 2.7 briey discusses agent allocation over two periods. Section 2.8 considers the
aects of employment regulation. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Focus of the Model: The Evidence
This paper is concerned with explaining a particular set of facts established in the sociology
literature comparing the experiences of low and high skill workers in non-traditional employ-
34ment relationships. The literature concerned with these workers notes that unlike traditional
employment relationships, characterized by full-time work over an indenite period, contin-
gent work lacks security and benets (Kalleberg, 2000). In addition to these issues, scholars
and activists expressed concern that contingent workers were at risk for poverty due to low
wages and limited opportunities for training and career advancement (Marler et al., 2002;
Vallas, 2012).
Following these arguments, a series of papers examine the experiences of agents work-
ing in contingent jobs, and determined that while some workers, particularly those who are
low skilled, do encounter this lack of security and of options, others achieve more freedom
and power as contingent workers than as traditional employees (Marler et al., 2002; Kunda
and Barley, 2006). This line of research used both hard data (i.e. wages, education, etc.), as
well as surveys or interviews. For example, Marler et al. (2002) nd that, though they have
some anxiety regarding the risks, high skill contingent workers choose that arrangement over
opportunities for traditional employment and are paid more than their traditional employ-
ment counterparts. Low skill contingent workers, on the other hand, hope to nd traditional
employment positions.
In order to understand and explain the rise of the low skill contingent worker, this
paper will focus on nding a labor market equilibrium in which
• Low skill contractors are at risk for unemployment.
• These agents are unable to secure positions as employees.
35The papers cited above also make note of a group of high skill agents who choose contracting
work over traditional employment. Section 2.5.3 discusses the relationship between this
pattern and the equilibrium types characterized.
2.3 A General Model
Suppose the labor market is composed of N agents and M rms. Let a rm be a location
where a task may arrive and may be undertaken. Production occurs when an agent completes
a task. Agents dier in skill level and tasks dier in value. An agent's skill level, , is the
probability of him successfully completing a task he attempts. Thus, when an agent with
skill  works on a task of value, v, the expected output is
v
Note than the cross partial of this production function is positive, @2
@@vv > 0. Thus, the
production maximizing allocation of agents is such that the highest skill agents work on the
highest value tasks.
Denote agent i's skill level, i. Without loss of generality, let i  i0 whenever i > i0,
so that agent 1 has the lowest skill level in the labor market and agent N has the highest.
The identity of each agent is public knowledge. Therefore, the productivity of the economy
is limited by the information available about the value of the task each rm receives at the
time agents are matched with rms. Each rm's task is a random variable that is realized
on task arrival. Tasks can take on one of two values,  v or v with  v > v.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline
Each agent must acquire some knowledge before he can work, and this knowledge
acquisition must be done before tasks arrive. An agent can either acquire knowledge that is
specic to a particular rm or acquire general knowledge. If the agent acquires rm specic
knowledge, then he cannot do a task at any other rm. An agent who acquires general
knowledge can do a task at any rm; however, some tasks can only be done by an agent
with rm specic knowledge. The type of knowledge acquired has no impact on performance
other than to determine which tasks an agent can work on.
Call an agent who acquires rm specic knowledge an employee, and the tasks that
can only be done by these agents employee specic. All other tasks are referred to as general
tasks. Because knowledge must be acquired ex-ante, specic knowledge agents must be
matched with rms ex-ante. Call an agent who is matched with a rm ex-post a contractor,
and an agent who remains unmatched unemployed. The timeline is shown in Figure 2.1.
37Each rm may receive up to one task. Firm j's probability of receiving a task with
value V 2 fH;Lg and specicity1 S 2 fE;Gg is pj;V;S. Then the probability that j does not
receive a task is (1  
P
V;S
pj;V;S) and the ex-ante expected value of rm j's task is
(pj;H;E + pj;H;G) v + (pj;L;E + pj;L;G)v
Assume pj;V;S 6= 0 for all j;V;S, but these may be arbitrarily small.
Assume all pj;V;S and covariances between rms are known so that the economy-wide
distribution of the M random variables (tasks) can be calculated. Finally, assume that all
agents and rms are risk-neutral. Thus, total surplus is maximized when total production is
maximized; the equilibrium is the social planner's allocation of agents to rms maximizing
productivity.
2.3.1 Describing an Equilibrium
The equilibrium species the allocation agents to rms. Each agent, i, may be matched with
a particular rm, j, ex-ante. Agents who are not matched ex-ante may be matched with a
rm (including rms already matched ex-ante) ex-post. This ex-post match is a function of
the realization of the M random variables in addition to the ex-ante allocation of agents.
For example, an agent assigned ex-post may be assigned to rm j in some states and to rm
j0 in others, depending on the types of tasks received by j and j0.
Given the ex-ante distributions of variables, an agent can be an employee, he can be
a contractor in every state (for every possible realization of the random variables), he can
1E denotes employee specic tasks, and G denotes general tasks.
38be unemployed in every state, or he can be a contractor in some states and unemployed in
other states. For clarity, call an agent who is a contractor in at least one state a contractor
and an agent who is unemployed in every state unemployed. Note that it may be impossible
for any agent to work as a contractor with certainty, depending on the joint distribution of
the random variables.
The task that an agent may work on depends on his rm assignment and the realiza-
tion of the random variables. Dene an agent's job as his rm allocation (specied for each
state) and his possible task assignments at the rm(s).
For any allocation of agents to rms, agent i's job consists of him working on high
value tasks qi;H of the time and low value tasks qi;L  (1 qi;H) of the time. An unemployed
agent, for example, will have qi;H = qi;L = 0. Thus, the productivity of agent i is under a
given allocation can be written
i[qi;H v + qi;Lv]
The total production in the economy, then, is
X
i
i[qi;H v + qi;Lv]
Condition 1. A necessary condition for a candidate allocation of agents to be an equilibrium
is that for any i and i0 with i0 < i, it must be that [qi;H v + qi;Lv]  [qi0;H v + qi0;Lv]. Lower
skill agents must have lower productivity jobs.
If this condition fails, then two agents could switch jobs and total production would
be increased; thus, if the condition is violated, the candidate allocation cannot be an equilib-
39rium. On the other hand, this condition is not sucient for an equilibrium, because dividing
the set of tasks into dierent jobs may increase total production, even when the condition
is satised for a xed set of jobs.
2.3.2 Ex-Post Agent Allocation
The model as setup so far allows for a few preliminary results regarding ex-post assignment
of agents. These results will be useful in the next two sections.
Lemma 1. For each realization of the random variables, unemployed agents are less skilled
than contractors in the following sense:
If agent i is unemployed, no agent with i0 < i can be employed as a contractor.
Proof. See Appendix.
When agents are allocated to rms ex-post, the highest skilled agents will be allocated
rst, so any agents left unallocated must be the lowest skill agents of those who have general
knowledge.
Lemma 2. In each state, there are only unemployed agents if each rm with a general task
hires an agent.
Proof. See Appendix.
An agent can only be unemployed if there are no tasks on which he can work. Unem-
ployed agents are not assigned ex-ante, but they have the potential to be assigned ex-post
to a general task. They can only remain unassigned ex-post when there are an insucient
number of tasks for the number of agents available to work on them.
40Lemma 3. Firm j can only hire agent i as a contractor if the following 2 conditions hold:
1. Firm j received a general task.
2. No agent with i0 > i is an employee of rm j.
Proof. See Appendix.
If a rm has not received a general task, then a contractor cannot do any productive
work at that rm. Furthermore, if the rm has already hired an employee who has more skill
than the potential contractor, hiring the contractor to do the task instead of the employee
will decrease the productivity on that task. Because the employee cannot be reassigned, this
will decrease overall production.
2.4 Low Skill Contingent Workers: An Equilibrium
Characterization
This paper seeks to explain apparent phenomena in the labor market established by sociology
scholars. Specically, the sociology literature discussing contingent workers suggests that
there is a class of low skill contractors who cycle in and out of unemployment and are locked
out of employee positions, which they would prefer to the unstable positions they hold.
This section describes a labor market equilibrium that reects these assertions. Subsequent
sections will identify conditions under which such an equilibrium arises.
First note that the contractors this sociology literature is concerned with must be
the lowest skill agents in the economy. This assertion is based on the fact that these agents
41would prefer an employee job, but are unable to obtain one. In a market equilibrium,
competition drives up the wages of higher skill agents. These agents have more employment
options available to them, because many rms want to hire them. Lower skill agents are less
desirable to rms, so their employment options are fewer.
If an agent is locked out of a type of job he wants, it must be that the rm oering
that job hires a higher skill agent, preventing the lower skill agent from being a competitive
candidate for the job. If a contractor was more highly skilled than an agent hired into
an employee position, then the rm hiring that agent would be at least as well o hiring
that contractor instead of its employee. If the equilibrium places the higher skill agent in
a contracting position, this agent must choose that job over the employee position because
the compensation is sucient to attract him2.
Claim 1. If i is a contractor who prefers a job as an employee, then all i0 < i are contractors.
Proof. Sketch (full proof in appendix): There cannot be an employee i0 who is of lower skill.
If there was such an i0, i would be competitive for that agent's job and would not be unable
to obtain an employee position. If there aren't any lower skill employees, then there must
be rms that have not hired an agent as an employee; otherwise, i could not work as a
contractor (by Lemma 3). But if there are rms that have not hired an employee, then
there cannot be an agent i0 who is unemployed (in every state), because surplus would be
increased by assigning i0 to one of these rms ex-ante. Thus, no lower skill agent can be an
employee, and no agent (of higher or lower skill) can be unemployed. All agents i0 < i must
also be contractors.
2This argument also explains why high skill and low skill contractors face dierent levels of stability.
42Now suppose that there are n agents who fall into this group of low skill contingent
workers. That is all agents i 2 [1;n] are contractors and agent n + 1 is not a contractor.
Following Lemma 1, agent n+1 must be an employee; there cannot be an unemployed agent
who has higher skill than a contractor. Furthermore, in order for the agents i 2 [1;n] to
each have a positive probability of being a contractor, each is a contractor in some state, it
must be that there is some state in which all of these n agents are contractors.
Claim. If agents i 2 [1;n] are contractors, then at least n rms must not have an employee.
Proof. If agent 1 is a contractor, there is some state in which he is not unemployed ex-post.
By Lemma 1, this implies that all of i 2 [2;n] are also contractors in this state; thus there
must be n tasks for these agents to work on. Each rm receives no more than 1 task, thus
these n tasks correspond to n rms. By Lemma 3, a rm hiring agent i ex-post cannot have
an employee with higher skill than i. However, none of the agents with less skill than i are
employees. Thus, these n rms must not have employees.
Observation. If agents i 2 [1;n] are contractors, no agent in unemployed.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1.
The equilibrium of interest has the following characteristics:
1. The n lowest skill agents are contractors.
2. Agent n + 1 is an employee.
3. No agents are unemployed.
4. At least n rms do not hire an employee.
43An equilibrium with these characteristics can be compared to other possible equilibria.
Because each agent is either a contractor, an employee, or unemployed, there are three
possible types of equilibria based on the job type of the lowest skill agents.
2.5 Other Equilibrium Types
2.5.1 Lowest Skill Agents are Unemployed
Suppose agents i 2 [1;n] are unemployed.
Claim. If the lowest skill agents are unemployed, indeed if there are any unemployed agents
in the economy, every rm must have hired an employee.
Proof. If a rm, j does not hire an employee, then its employee specic tasks must not be
done. If agent i is unemployed with probability 1, then qi;H = qi;L = 0. Assigning i to rm
j increases surplus by at least i[pj;H;E v + pj;L;Ev].
No agent can be unemployed if there are tasks that the agent could be assigned to
work on.
Claim. There are no other unemployed agents in the labor market.
Suppose agents i 2 [1;n] are unemployed. If agent ^ i > n is unemployed, then i0 must be
unemployed for each i0 2 [n;^ i].
Proof. By contradiction: First, note that i0 cannot be a contractor, by Lemma 3. Next,
suppose there is an i0 who is an employee. Then Condition 1 is violated because
[qi0;H v + qi0;Lv] > [q^ i;H v + q^ i;Lv] = 0
44Claim. If agents i 2 [1;n] are unemployed, agent n + 1 must be an employee.
Proof. By the rst claim, every rm must have an employee. All employees must have at
least as high skill as n + 1, because agents 1 through n are unemployed. Then, by Lemma
3, n + 1 cannot be a contractor. Thus, n + 1 must be an employee.
An equilibrium in which the least skilled agents are unemployed has the following
characteristics:
1. The n lowest skill agents are unemployed.
2. No additional agents are unemployed.
3. Agent n + 1 is an employee.
4. Each rm hires an employee.
2.5.2 Lowest Skill Agents are Employees
Suppose agents i 2 [1;n] are employees.
Claim. In an equilibrium in which the lowest skill agents are employees, it must be the case
that no agents are unemployed.
Proof. If i is an employee and i0 > i is unemployed, then [qi;H v +qi;Lv] > [qi0;H v +qi0;Lv] = 0
violating Condition 1.
45If an agent i is unemployed, then his productivity is 0 because qi;H = qi;L = 0.
However, if the lowest skill agent is an employee, then q1;H > 0 and q1;L > 0. Therefore,
such an allocation of agents violates Condition 1, and cannot be an equilibrium.
Observation. As each agent must be an employee or a contractor, agent n + 1 must be a
contractor.
This type of equilibrium will have the following characteristics:
1. The n lowest skill agents are employees.
2. No agents are unemployed.
3. Agent n + 1 is a contractor.
2.5.3 High Skill Contractors
In each type of equilibrium, higher skill agents may be contractors, and in some instances
the highest skill agents in the economy may be contractors. As noted in the last section, any
contractor i for whom there is a lower skill agent i0 < i who is a employee must choose his
position over standard employment, because in equilibrium all agents and rms's must have
individual rationality constraints satised.
Agents with general knowledge have the ability to move around the economy to where
their skill can be most productive. Thus, depending on the allocation of other agents and
on the possible realizations of the random variables a contractor may be more likely to be
matched with a task than an employee, and furthermore, can be more likely to be matched
with a high value task.
46Consider an example following the model presented in Chapter 1. Suppose the ex-
post realization of tasks is deterministic, so there is only uncertainty over which rms will
receive which tasks. Further suppose that there number of rms is very large, so the ex-post
realization of tasks, as well as any number of agents, can be expressed as fractions of the
number of rms. Further, assume rms are ex-ante identical. Finally, let there be only two
types of agents, high skill with   and low skill with .
Because the ex-post realization of the random variables is deterministic, the demand
for contractors is a deterministic function of the ex-ante assignment of agents. Then, the
task assignment of any agent who acquires general knowledge is known ex-ante (only the
rm assignment is unknown ex-ante). For any agent that acquires general knowledge, there
will be a high value or low value task for him to work on, or no task at all. Because pV;S > 0
for all V;S, if there are any contractors, some contractor works on a high value task with
certainty.
Then, if any agent is a contractor, a high skill agent must be a contractor. A rm
that hires a high skill agent ex-ante cannot increase performance by hiring any agent ex-post.
Therefore, a high skill agent who acquires specic knowledge does any task his rm receives.
If only low skill agents are contractors, then there is some agent i with skill i =  and agent
i0 > i with skill i0 =   such that
 v = qi;H v + qi;Lv > qi0;H v + qi0;Lv = (pH;E + pH;G) v + (pL;E + pL;G)v
violating Condition 1. If the distribution over tasks is not deterministic, but has a minimum
number of realized tasks, the argument continues to hold. In this case, in an equilibrium
47where low skill contractors are at risk for unemployment and are excluded from employee
positions, there will also be high skill contractors with less instability and who choose those
jobs over employee positions.
2.6 When does the Equilibrium Reect the Evidence?
Now that the three equilibria types have been characterized, it is possible to determine
when the equilibrium is likely to be a low skill contractors equilibrium. The information
about unemployment in each equilibrium type indicates that the relative number of agents,
compared to the number of rms, or task random variables, has an impact on which types
of equilibria are possible.
2.6.1 Relative Thickness of Supply and Demand
In any equilibrium, each rm will only hire one agent as an employee. If more than one
agent is hired, the higher skill agent will always do the rm's task. Therefore, the lower
skill employee will have zero productivity, and surplus can be weakly increased by leaving
that agent unallocated ex-ante. Furthermore, the number of contractors is bounded by the
number of rms because each rm receives at most one task. Any ex-ante unallocated agents
in excess of the maximum number of tasks will be unemployed with probability 1.
Therefore, in an equilibrium in which there are no unemployed agents, the maximum
number of agents is 2M. This is the case in both low skill contractor type of equilibrium
and in the low skill employee type of equilibrium. Furthermore, in the low skill contractor
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type, there must be at least 1 rm without an employee, so the number of agents is bounded
above at 2M   1.
Finally, in the low skill unemployed type of equilibrium, all rms must hire an em-
ployee. Therefore, the number of agents must be at least the number of rms plus one
unemployed agent, M + 1. These relationships are indicated in Figure 2.2.
As the thickness of the supply side of the market increases in relation to the demand
side, the equilibrium is more likely to be a low skill unemployed equilibrium. When the
relative supply of labor is small, low skill agents must be employees or contractors. The next
subsection will show that when labor supply is very low, low skill agents are likely to be
contractors because under these conditions agent mobility becomes important.
2.6.2 A Necessary Condition for Low Skill Contingent Workers
Beyond this basic comparison of all equilibria types, the characteristics of the equilibrium
type of interest indicates a condition for its own existence. Recall that in an equilibrium in
49which the lowest skill agents are contractors, there are some rms that do not hire employees.
This fact can be used to further assess whether an allocation satisfying the characteristics
of such an equilibrium is in fact an optimal allocation.
Condition 1 states that for a given set of jobs, agents must be assortatively matched
with jobs. A contingent worker allocation calls for an additional necessary condition due
to those ex-ante unmatched rms. For such an allocation to be an equilibrium, moving an
ex-post assigned agent to one of these rms cannot increase surplus.
Recalling that the n least skilled agent are contractors, call the m  n rms without
an employee j 2 [1;m]. The increase from assigning agent i to rm j as an employee is at
least:
i [pj;H;E v + pj;L;Ev]
because employee specic tasks are not otherwise done. Any general tasks previously done
by a higher skill agent can still be done by that agent; if a general task had been done by a
lower skill agent, it will be done by i after this reassignment, so the increase in surplus may
be strictly greater than the expression above.
Agent i's productivity as a contractor is given by
qi;H v + qi;Lv
Making i an employee would mean that he could not work on the tasks he would work on
as a contractor. However, if i is no longer a contractor, some of his tasks may be reassigned
to other contractors. Therefore, this is the upper bound of the cost of moving agent i. The
50movement of an agent will cause an increase in production when the surplus gain is greater
than the surplus loss. Then if
surplus loss  i [qi;H v + qi;Lv] < i [pj;H;E v + pj;L;Ev]  surplus gain
for some i;j, the allocation cannot be an equilibrium. This inequality is most likely to hold
for agent 1 and the rm with max
j
[pj;H;E v + pj;L;Ev].
Thus the following condition, then, is necessary for the equilibrium to be a low skill
contractor equilibrium.
Condition 2. A necessary condition for an employment pattern in which rms j 2 [1;m]
do not hire an employee to be an equilibrium is:
q1;H v + q1;Lv > max
j2[1;m]
pj;H;E  v + pj;L;E v
This condition is likely to hold when pj;H;E and pj;L;E are small relative to qi;H and
qi;L. Clearly, that is the case when there is little rm specicity. The condition is also likely
to hold when each individual rm has a low volume of all tasks, but contractors have a high
volume of work because they spread their time among many rms. Thus, as stated in the
last subsection, the equilibrium is likely to be characterized by low skill contractors when
the number of rms is large relative to the supply of labor.
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Figure 2.3: Two Period Timeline
2.7 Two Period Model
The literature on contingent workers emphasizes the instability of the jobs of these workers.
The model as presented in Section 2.3 captures this instability through a probability of
unemployment. Instability could also be an aect of change over time. In order to explore
that possibility, this section discusses an extension of the model to two periods. Assuming
that agent assignment in the rst period puts no restrictions on assignment in the second
period, this model is essentially the model presented above repeated twice. The timeline in
shown in Figure 2.3.
2.7.1 Stationary Ex-ante Distributions
If in each period the ex-ante distribution of tasks is the same, the allocation strategy will be
the same for both periods. That is, if i is assigned to j ex-ante in Period 1, i and j will also
be matched ex-ante in Period 2. All agents who are not assigned ex-ante in Period 1 are
also not assigned ex-ante in Period 2. Any dierence in assignment between Periods 1 and
2 must be a result of a dierence in the ex-post realization of tasks. In this way contractors
52can cycle in and out of unemployment. However, if the distribution of tasks is not changing,
then employed agents will remain employed, and unemployed agents will remain unemployed
in both periods.
2.7.2 Changing Distributions
The arguments made by sociologists regarding contingent workers raise an interesting ques-
tion about low skill workers. When could we expect low skill workers to cycle in and out of
unemployment, but into employee positions rather than contractor positions?
Consider an equilibrium to the single period model in which the lowest skill agents are
unemployed. Recall that in such an equilibrium, all rms must hire an employee. This result
implies that in order for agents to move between unemployment and being employees, there
must be a change in the number of rms, or possible tasks. In other words, that pattern can
only arise through a pattern of expansion and contraction of the economy.
There may be additional cases where an agent is unemployed in Period 1 but an
employee in Period 2. However, in such a circumstance it would have to be the case that the
agent had a positive probability of being a contractor in Period 1, but wasn't in the realized
state of the world. This may happen when the volume of tasks at some rms is uctuating.
Agents move between unemployment and contracting because there is uncertainty
over the overall demand for labor in the market. Very specic conditions are required for an
equilibrium in which some agents move between unemployment and being and employee or
being an employee and being a contractor, but no agents move between unemployment and
begin a contractor. Namely, the ex-post realization of the variables must be deterministic
53in each period, but the size of the market must be uctuating|total demand for labor is
changing but is known ex-ante each period. As this scenario is unlikely, the pattern of
instability observed in contingent work may be a feature of most labor market equilibira.
2.8 Employment Policy Considerations
The model presented in this paper captures the forces pushing employers to use contractors
rather than employees. Uncertainty and quantity of labor supply are important factors in
determining the size of the contracting labor market. In addition, labor regulation may have
an impact on the use of contracting.
These policies tend to only apply to employees in an eort to protect these workers.
However, they make hiring employees unattractive. Two types of such policies are those
aecting minimum compensation (i.e. requiring employers to provide employment insurance,
pensions, or health insurance) and limits on dismissals (i.e. an employee cannot be red
before a certain amount of time or under various conditions). This section discusses the
impact each of these two types of regulation may have on the equilibrium allocation of
agents.
2.8.1 Minimum Compensation Requirements
A policy setting a minimum wage or compensation package (such as health benets), wMC,
may have an impact on the achievable allocation of agents. Consider such a policy that
applies only to employees.
54Whether and what type of impact a minimum compensation policy will have depends
on the level of the policy relative to the unregulated wage of the lowest skill employee,
agent i. In an unregulated competitive labor market equilibrium, the wage of agent i must
satisfy participation and rationality constraints of both the agent and the rm he works for.
Therefore, it must be the case that wi 2 [0;iE[vi]], where E[vi] is the expected value of
the rm's tasks worked on by i. The level of the wage depends on the thickness of each side
of the labor market. For example, if the supply side of the market is very thick compared
to the demand side (there are many more agents than rms), the wage will be close to the
agents' outside option, or 0. On the other hand, if the demand side is thick relative to the
supply side (there are few agents compared to rms), the wage will be close to the rm's
outside option, iE[vi]. Thus, there are three possible cases for the relationship between
wMC and wi.
Case 1: Minimum Compensation is Not Binding
If
iEi[v] > wi > w
MC
then the lowest skill employee is paid more than the minimum compensation requires. Thus,
the policy is not binding and doesn't have an eect on agent allocation or on the compensa-
tion of any agents.
Case 2: Minimum Compensation Binding and Raises Wages
If
iEi[v] > w
MC > wi
55then the policy is binding, but the productivity of the lowest skill employee is larger than
the minimum compensation. Thus, the rm's participation constraint will continue to be
satised at the higher wage. The allocation of agents, in this case, will not be impacted by
the policy, but wages will be.
It is clear that the wage of agent i will increase, as will any other agents whose wage
falls below wMC, because i0Ei0[v] > iEi[v] for all i0 > i. The wages of all other agents
will also increase. The increased wage of the lowest skill worker makes hiring higher skill
agents at current wages relatively more attractive, increasing competition for these agents,
and thus driving up the wages of those agents.
Because the allocation of agents is not impacted by a policy of this level, this policy
does not have an eect on the eciency of the market. Total production remains the same;
however, the policy results in a surplus transfer from rms to agents.
Case 3: Minimum Compensation Binding and Eciency Decreased
If
w
MC > iEi[v] > wi
then the policy is binding, and the higher wage violates the participation constraint of the
rm hiring agent i. Thus, this rm will no longer be willing to hire agent i at this level of
compensation. This agent will either become a contractor or unemployed.
Beginning with the lowest skill employee, the minimum compensation can be com-
pared with the wage of employees of increasing skill to determine the overall impact on the
labor market. Note, however, that if some agents' productivity and wages fall into Case
3, then the outside option of more highly skilled agents may weaken because the pool of
56unemployed agents creates competition for their jobs. Thus, the wages used to determine
the impact on those agents' jobs must be adjusted3.
The main ways in which minimum compensation will impact the labor market equi-
librium with respect to low skill contractors is in increasing the incidence of such equilibria
as well as weakly increasing the numbers of low skill contractors within such equilibria. The
regulation only impacts the allocation of agents in Case 3, where some rms no longer hire
employees.
These employees may become contractors or they may become unemployed. The dis-
placement of these agents weakly increases the demand for contractors because rms without
employees will want to hire contractors, but these rms may have already used contractors for
general tasks. The displacement, then, may increase the number of contractors if the there
are states in which demand for contractors exceeds supply. Thus, the number of contractors
is weakly increasing in with regulation.
Displaced agents are always the lowest skill employees. When these agents become
contractors, they are like the low skill contractors in the equilibrium of interest in that there
are no employees with lower skill than them. Thus, these regulated equilibria can also reect
sociologists' characterization of the labor market: These agents are at risk of unemployment
and they prefer employment jobs that are unavailable to them.
Any labor market with an unregulated equilibrium in which the lowest skill agents
are employees or unemployed can, thus, resemble a low skill contractors equilibrium under
minimum compensation regulation. The dierence between these equilibria under regulation
3An interesting result here is that the minimum wage could potentially reduce the wages of more pro-
ductive agents. A discussion of this result is outside the scope of this paper.
57and the unregulated equilibrium type with lowest skill agents as contractors is that in these
equilibria some agents may also be unemployed with probability 1.
2.8.2 Limits on Dismissals
When employees jobs are protected by limits to dismissals, contractors may be used by a
rm so as to not commit to employing an agent in the next period. Avoiding commitment
is only valuable when a rm's task volume is expected to decrease in the future. However,
in an unregulated competitive equilibrium, an agent will move between rms only when the
most productive use for his skill changes. If rm j is no longer the best use for agent i's
skill, then the wage oered by rm j will be lower than i's outside option, in which case the
agent would choose his outside option. So limits on dismissals would not have an aect on
allocation.
This argument demonstrates that a policy limiting dismissals can only have an eect
on allocation when wages are not allowed to adjust to changes in the market. In this way,
limits on dismissals actually function in a similar way to minimum compensation regulation.
However, the minimum compensation in this case is agent specic rather than market-wide.
Limits on employee dismissals are argued to have an additional implication for con-
tingent workers. Agents are often hired as contractors before being hired by the same rm
as a full time employee. Some suggest that this pattern is a result of limits on employee
dismissals combined with asymmetric information about agent skill. A rm is able to learn
about an agent's skill only after it has hired the agent. Thus, hiring the agent as a contractor
allows the rm to learn about the agent before committing to employing him.
58This pattern, however, disproportionately aects low skill contingent workers. The
model suggest that because dismissal limiting regulations are equally likely to bind on all
skill levels (as the cost is dependent on the employment wage), the value from learning of
contracting should apply to any skill level agent. In order for the asymmetric information
argument to hold, it must be that rms have better information about the skills of high skill
agents. Thus, dierences in skill signaling for high and low skill agents may be a promising
area of future research.
2.9 Conclusion
As the use of non-standard employment relationships has increased, the reported growth
of an underclass of contingent workers has caused concern among sociologists and policy
makers. Understanding the conditions that lead to these labor market patterns is essential
both from a policy perspective and for agents who are experiencing instability.
While other papers focus on trends in over the entire labor market or on the rm's
decision of which stang practices to use, this paper specically explores the experiences of
individual agents. Using a basic model with no contracting problems (i.e. moral hazard or
asymmetric information), it demonstrates that particular patterns identied by sociologists
can be part of the equilibrium in a competitive, unregulated labor market.
The conditions under which this type of equilibrium is likely to arise reect the uncer-
tainty which rms have been increasingly confronting in the modern economy. In particular,
limited and uncertain stang needs can both contribute to increased contracting. Further-
59more, regulations that have been implemented to protect employees impact the equilibrium
allocation of agents in the labor market, and make this type of equilibrium more likely.
The general model outlined here can be used as a basis for understanding how agents
move through the labor market as conditions change. An important simplifying assumption
made here is that agents skill levels are observable, which allows for an ecient match.
Future work can examine employment patterns when there is asymmetric information about
skill. This type of extension would allow for the identication of the informational value of
dierent employment practices.
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Division of Labor, Specialization, and
Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
The division of labor is a fundamental characteristic of society; production is shared among
groups, and no member of a group would be able to produce his share of consumed output
individually. The nature of humans as social animals implies production will be shared as no
individual can survive alone, but the particular way in which work is divided has an impact
on output. The division of labor facilitates specialization and, thus, increases productivity.
Yet in many instances, labor is not completely divided; some types of tasks are shared among
multiple agents rather being divided to take full advantage of gains from specialization.
For example, in an academic department, research (and to a lesser extent teaching) is
often very specialized with relatively little overlap between two member's areas of expertise.
Dividing labor allows each individual to develop a deeper expertise on a narrower eld.
However, the members of a department will share other duties, taking turns on recruitmentcommittees, for example. Within a household, some tasks may be specialized to one spouse
or the other, but certain tasks are done by both spouses, and dierent households dier in
the amount of overlap.
The term division of labor has been used to describe the number of agents working
together to produce a particular good (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Wadeson, 2013). An
assumption implicit in this denition is that agents working together each work on dierent
tasks1. However, the above examples illustrate that division of labor can vary even with
xed team size. This paper presents a model of team production that allows the division of
labor and team size to vary independently in order to identify conditions under which job
overlap outperforms division of labor. Output is produced by agents working on projects,
which consist of a variety of tasks. Team size and job design (the assignment of tasks to
the agents in the team) are optimized given the distribution of over the types of tasks in
projects, as well as the quantity of projects.
The results of the model encompass established results in the literature, where in-
creasing returns to specialization drive the division of labor (Becker and Murphy, 1992;
Stigler, 1951). The model demonstrates that job overlap is at a minimum when the tasks
required for production are predictable and unlimited. The literature discussing division of
labor and specialization has assumed that the distribution of task types required for pro-
duction is constant and that the quantity produced is limited only by the productivity of
the team (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Rosen, 1983; Wadeson,
1Indeed the results of these papers, which specically discuss division of labor, and others that focus
on specialization (i.e. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Rosen (1983)) result in non-overlapping special-
izaitons
622013)2. Both of these assumptions reect a focus on manufacturing industries embedded in
the discussion of division of labor since Adam Smith.
While the manufacture of a good requires a set of tasks that is identical for each
good produced, production in other industries is not so predictable. In agriculture it may
be unclear when the harvest will take place and which crop will be ripe for harvesting
rst; a customer service department may deal with more sales one day and more technical
support a dierent day; a salon may not know if there will be more demand for haircuts or
for manicures. These examples illustrate that job overlap, as opposed to division of labor,
provides value under uncertainty by allowing agents to move to the tasks where their labor
most needed at any given time.
These non-manufacturing examples share another feature: the quantity of work avail-
able at a particular time is typically limited. Whereas an academic can always write another
paper and a pin factory can alway produce another pin, the customer service agent can only
increase the practice of his expertise when an additional client requests his services. Thus,
for some types of tasks, unlike manufacturing, decreasing the breadth of specialization does
not imply an increase in the depth of specialization. Therefore, it is not always the case that
division of labor leads to gains from specialization.
The model shows that when the distribution of task types is uncertain but the total
amount of work is xed, the optimal job design will assign the same set of tasks to multiple
agents, who can then eld a uctuating volume of tasks in their area of expertise. If the
distributions of task types and quantify of work both vary, then there is a tradeo between
2Note that Wadeson (2013) only assumes unlimited production potential, not uncertain workow. How-
ever, the current paper shows that both assumptions must be relaxed for overlapping jobs
63specialization, requiring increased team size, and agent utilization. Employing more agents
allows labor to be divided more, but the potential gains from specialization are oset by the
cost of reducing utilization of agent time.
Limits on productive tasks are descriptive of service industries, but also reect an
inability to smooth production over time. While, the total amount of work on a particular
task type may be enough to support an agent specializing, when tasks cannot be moved
between periods, constraints on the agent's time can prevent him from gaining expertise.
Thus, the model can be used to analyze an economy that is increasingly service based as
well as increasingly volatile.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section sets up the model. Section 3.3
replicates previous results, then examines the eects of deterministic and stochastic limits
to project quantity on specialization. Section 3.4 discusses the eect of task distribution on
job overlap for unlimited projects and deterministic project limits. The tradeo between
specialization and agent utilization is discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
An agent is able to specialize, increasing his productivity on a particular type of task by
spending more time working on that type of task. Examples of this phenomenon abound, but
this fact is particularly salient to academics who specialize in narrow subelds. Specialization
is facilitated by the division of labor. When an agent does not need to produce each good
and service himself, he can use time that would otherwise be devoted to producing a wider
variety of goods to specialize.
64Suppose that tasks have equal productive potential, but are horizontally dierenti-
ated. Let 
 be the set of task types, s. A project P is a set of tasks, with distribution over

, FP(s). Suppose that all projects are the same size, and normalize jPj = 1. Assume that
tasks require a xed amount of time to complete, which is identical for all tasks; then in some
sense the size of P measures both the number of tasks in it and the number of man-hours
required to complete the project. Therefore, say a project takes one unit of agent-time to
complete. For simplicity, assume each project is continuously divisible so a project can be
divided in any way between any number of agents.
Let i;s be the frequency with which an agent, i, works on task type s 2 
. His
productivity from working on any task of type s is E(i;s). There are decreasing returns to
practice, so E0 > 0 and E00 < 0. Let AP;s be the set of agents who work on type s tasks in
project P. Project production is a function of the productivity on each task in the project.
Following Becker and Murphy (1992), assume production is determined by the minimum
performance on a task in the project. Production on project P is given by
Y (P) = min
s2P

min
i2AP;s
E(i;s)

Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that for a productive activity that requires all tasks
to complete, the production function will be the minimum function. Their argument focuses
on on goods and interprets Y as quantity produced; however, this production function also
applies to quality, which is a more natural interpretation when considering productive value
on a project of xed size, as modeled here.
65The output quality interpretation can be applied to goods; a product is sometimes
only as good as its lowest quality part. Moreover, quality may be a better measure of
productive value than quantity for the provision of services. The value of customer service is
in customer retention which depends on quality. One bad experience can cause a customer
to switch brands, so the minimum quality of service is essential in determining productive
value.
3.3 Limits to Specialization
3.3.1 Specialization Limited by the Extent of the Market
This model can be used to replicate the result from Becker and Murphy (1992), based on
Smith's (1776) argument, that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.
Let 
 = [0;1] so there is no limit to how narrow an agent's area of expertise can be. Assume
all projects are identical. Let FP be uniform on 
. Further, suppose that the availability
of projects is unlimited, so that as soon as one project is completed another can begin.
This assumption applies well to industries like manufacturing of consumer goods or research
production; as noted in the introduction, it is always possible to produce an additional pin
or an additional paper.
An agent who works on a project alone divides his time evenly among all tasks,
which in this case is the same as dividing time evenly among task types due to the uniform
distribution. Thus, the agent will do one task of each type (fP(s) = 1 8s) during each
66period, s = 1 for all s. The production of this agent will be
E(1)
Suppose an agent works on m projects in a unit of time. Without loss of generality3 denote
the set of tasks he completes for project j, [sj;  sj]. The time constraint for this agent is
m X
j=1
( sj   sj) = 1
An agent's prociency on a type of task, s, is a function of the number of these m projects
for which this type of task is in the agent's task set. Dene a binary variable j;s = 1 when
s 2 [sj;  sj] and 0 otherwise. Then
s =
m X
j=1
j;s
A team of n agents can complete up to n projects each period. The maximum possible
output on a singe project is
E(n)
because if i;s > n for some agent i and task type s, then i;s0 < n for some s0 6= s, otherwise
i's time constraint is violated. This maximum is achievable on all n projects by setting
[si;j;  si;j] = [i 1
n ; i
n] for agents i 2 [1;n]. The optimal task assignment for a team of n agents
divides the set of task types into n non-overlapping jobs of equal size. Then the per unit
3All tasks have equal value and are equally likely; therefore tasks can be relabeled so that each agent's
job is a continuous set.
67time output of n agents is
nE(n)
The productivity of each agent in a team increases with the team size. Therefore, the optimal
team includes all agents in the market, denoted N.
Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that this result shows that the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market. While it is true that specialization here is increasing in
the number of agents and is only limited by the total number of agents in the market, in a
sense labor is equally divided for all n because no two agents work on the same task type
for any size team.
3.3.2 Specialization Limited by the Availability of Projects
The assumption that the number of projects is unlimited allows any size specialization to ll
an agent's time, which gives the agent the practice required to improve prociency. Assume
instead that the number of tasks available in a given period is limited. Limits to the amount
of work available are typical in service industries. Customer service representatives, hair
stylists, and dry cleaners (to name a few) can only provide their services when a customer
requests them.
Suppose that the number of projects available in a unit of time is M < N. Then M
agents can complete the available work during that time. Maximum production is achieved
by partitioning 
 into M subsets, [si;  si], with Mj[si;  si]j  1. The depth of specialization
is clearly limited by the number of tasks available. Increasing the size of the team beyond
M agents, while supported by market size, cannot increase production. Further, if there is
68any other activity with value  > 0 that agents can participate in, including leisure, the size
of the team, as well as the narrowness of specialization is strictly limited by the volume of
projects available.
3.3.3 Uncertainty over Project Limits
When project availability is limited, it is usually also uncertain. Demand for services may
be cyclical or uctuate unpredictably. Rather than assisting twenty customers each day, a
customer service department may help ve one day and thirty the next.
Note that under uncertainty an agent's prociency will depend on the realization of
the random variable over time. The following analysis uses average frequency to determine
an agent's prociency. This notion of prociency is advantageous for two reasons. First,
for a long horizon, any realization of the random variables will have the same average.
Furthermore, as opposed to a discounting function, with a long horizon, the average frequency
does not uctuate with uctuations in work volume4.
Assume that in a unit of time, there are m 2 R projects available. (A continuous
approximation will simplify the notation and calculations.) Let G(m) be the distribution
over this number of projects. Suppose a team consists of n agents, then for all m  n, the
job design problem is like that when the availability of projects is unlimited. In these cases,
the optimal division would be n jobs of equal size. For m < n, the limit of task availability
4This analysis, then, focuses on long-term job and team design. The results also hold for a two period
model in which prociency is gained in the rst period and used for production in the second. A two period
example is given in the Appendix to illustrate that the same forces drive optimal job design.
69is binding; however, in these cases, dividing projects into n equal size jobs for n  m does
not decrease productivity.
Therefore, the optimal division will be to assign each of the n agents an equal size
subset of task types. For example
[si;  si] =

i   1
n
;
i
n

for 1  i  n. For all m, each agent does his subset of each of the m projects available. For
each agent i in the team, the team works on an ith task whenever m  i. Therefore,
s =
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx
and total output is given by
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

E
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

Team Size and Uncertainty
The previous two subsections have identied the optimal team size in two extreme cases:
When there is certainty over the number of projects and this number is limited below the
total number of agents, the optimal team size is equal to the number of projects available.
On the other hand, when the probability that the number of projects available exceeds the
number of agents goes to 1, the optimal team size is the total number of agents.
70These two cases suggest that optimal team size is a function of the distribution of task
availability, G(m). Indeed, the optimal team size is increasing in mean of this distribution.
Some distributions can be ranked in terms of uncertainty, for example, when one is a mean
preserving spread of another. In addition to increasing in the mean of G(m), team size is
increasing in uncertainty for a renement of mean preserving spreads.
The output function in terms of n derived in early sections is weakly increasing in n.
Suppose now that there is a cost to adding agents to a team C(n), with C0 > 0 and C00  0.
A brief discussion of possible cost functions and interpretations is given below, but for now
assume that this function is such that there is an internal solution to the optimal team size
problem.
max
n
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

E
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

  C(n)
It will help to pick a specic prociency function E; following Becker and Murphy (1992)
again, let E(x) = x with  2 (0;1). Then the rst order condition of the optimization
problem is
(1 + )
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

(1   G(n))   C
0(n) = 0
For an internal solution to exist, the rst term must be decreasing in n. This fact combined
with the fact that C00  0 indicates a condition for the optimal team size to be increasing.
Denoting the optimal team size nk when the distribution is Gk, it must be that n2 > n1
when
(1 + )
Z n
0
1   G2(x)dx

(1   G2(n)) > (1 + )
Z n
0
1   G1(x)dx

(1   G1(n)) (1)
71at n = n1.
It is plain, then, that n2 > n1 when G2 rst order stochastic dominates G1, because
inequality (1) holds for all n. When there is a higher probability of more projects being
available, the optimal team has more members. More interestingly, a mean preserving spread
can also lead to an increase in the optimal team size. In this way, optimal team size is
increasing in uncertainty, for a given expected number of projects.
Let Gr(m) be a distribution on the number of projects available, and let Gr+1 be a
mean-preserving spread of Gr.
Claim 1. There is a probability (1 G
r) 2

(1   Gr(nr));(1   Gr(nr))
1
1+

such that nr+1 
nr if and only if
(1   Gr+1(nr))  (1   G

r) (2)
Proof. See Appendix.
A mean preserving spread satisfying inequality (1) places more weight on higher
project limit values. Then a mean preserving spread of Gr with a suciently thicker right
tail above the optimal team size for Gr has a larger optimal team size than Gr. When
uncertainty over the number of projects available increases in a way that puts suciently
more weight on the number of projects exceeding the optimal team size, the team size
increases. even when the mean number of projects remains the same.
Observation. Any mean preserving spread of a distribution with no uncertainty increases
optimal team size.
This is because (1   Gr(n
r)) = 0 for a distribution in which all weight is on n
r, and
(1   Gr+1(n
r)) > 0 for any mean preserving spread of Gr.
72Costs to Increasing Team Size
Elsewhere in the literature regarding division of labor, specialization, and team size, coordi-
nation and communication costs are suggested as limits to team size (Becker and Murphy,
1992; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994). The functional form of these costs is considered to be
convex. Another possibility is that there are outside activities, like leisure, that provide a
private value but cannot be traded. In this case, the cost function would be linear in team
size.
This type of cost function has not been a focus in the past because an internal solution
to the team size problem with linear cost is only possible if the production function is concave
in team size, which is at odds with increasing returns to scale. When uncertainty over the
number of available projects is introduced to the model of specialization, the production
function may be concave in team size, depending on the shape of the distribution. Thus, it
is possible for team size to be limited by uncertainty, in a setting where communication or
coordination costs are minimal.
3.4 Limits to the Division of Labor
3.4.1 Task Sharing under Predictable Production
The result that the set of task types is divided into non-overlapping jobs rests on the as-
sumption that all projects are uniformly distributed over all possible task types, 
. It may
not be the case that the optimal specialization requires a partition of the set of task types
into n subsets for n agents. Joint production is not always maximized with a division of
73labor and trade. Even with unlimited divisibility of task types, some agents may share a
specialization because proportionally more of some tasks are required for project completion.
Assume again that all projects are identical and that there is unlimited availability
of projects. Let the density of task types in a project be the piecewise function:
f(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2
3 if s 2 [0; 1
2]
4
3 if s 2 (1
2;1]
Then a team of n agents can complete n projects in one period. The maximum prociency
that can decide project output is E(s) = (E 2
3n); that is the maximum output on a project
is the maximum prociency with which an agent can do the least frequent type of task. For
every one task of type s 2 [0; 1
2], there are two of type s0 = s+ 1
2. Thus, if an agent completes
all tasks of type s0 2 (1
2;1], the prociency on this task type is E(4
3n), while total production
will remain
nE

2
3
n

because performance on less frequent tasks cannot be increased. Therefore, the following two
task allocations, both of which divide the project into n equally sized jobs, achieve maximum
output5. Task types s 2 [0; 1
2] are divided into equal segments, with no two agents working
on the same type in this region. One allocation would divide the task types s 2 (1
2;1] in a
similar way, with no over overlapping jobs, but with smaller segments for each agent than
5In this example n may be the maximum number of agents or the maximum number to tasks, depending
which is the limiting factor.
74in the range [0; 1
2). That is, for each agent, i 2 [1;n]
[si;  si] =

1
2
i   1
n
;
1
2
i
n

+

1
2
+
1
2
i   1
n
;
1
2
+
1
2
i
n

The other optimal allocation divides task types in s 2 (1
2;1] into larger jobs that are then
shared by two agents:
[si;  si] =

1
2
i   1
n
;
1
2
i
n

+

1
2
+
j   1
n
;
1
2
+
j
n

with
j =
8
> > > <
> > > :
i+1
2 if i odd
i
2 if i even
for i 2 [1;n].
The example shows that for high volume tasks, it can be equally productive to have
multiple agents share the same specialty as it would be to have them divide that specially,
becoming even more procient in a smaller set of task types. In this case, the result is due
to the fact that lower volume tasks cannot support the same level of specialization, so the
gains from further dividing labor on high value tasks cannot be realized. However, this is an
important case to consider because it has implications for when project distributions over
task types vary. In fact, it may be that overlapping jobs are strictly better than a complete
division of labor because there is uncertainty over which task types will be high frequency.
753.4.2 Task Sharing under Project Uncertainty
To illustrate this point, consider a simple example of the model. Suppose that there are two
task types, 
 = fA;Bg. Further suppose that the number of projects is limited, but there
are two projects with certainty. Finally, suppose that each project consists entirely of one
of the task types. There is a probability, pA of there being two projects of type A tasks, a
probability pB of there being two projects of type B tasks and a (1 pA pB) of there being
one project of each type.
First suppose the team consists of two agents. Then when both projects are the same,
each agent will work on one of them. The only question is how to divide the work on two
dierent projects. Let i;s be agent i's share of the project containing only s type tasks.
Then, agent i's frequency of working on s is
i;s = ps + (1   ps   ps0)i;s
Note that,
P
i
i;s = 1 and
P
s
i;s = 1, so i;s = i0;s0 = . Thus, there is only one choice
parameter to optimize output. Because the production function is the minimum function,
output is discontinuous at  = 0. Further, because the two agents have the same potential
76for productivity, the domain of output can be limited to  2 [0; 1
2].
E[Y ( = 0)] =
pA[E(pA) + E(1   pB)]
+ (1   pA   pB)[E(1   pB) + E(1   pA)]
+ pB [E(pB) + E(1   pA)]
E[Y ( 6= 0)] =
pA[E(pA + (1   pA   pB)) + E(pA + (1   pA   pB)(1   ))]
+ (1   pA   pB)[E(pA + (1   pA   pB)) + E(pB + (1   pA   pB))]
+ pB [E(pB + (1   pa   pb)(1   )) + E(pB + (1   pa   pb))]
For  6= 0, E[Y ()] is increasing in . Thus, optimal task sharing is either  = 0 or
 = 1
2. In either state where both projects are the same,  = 1
2 does better for all pA and
pB because E() is concave. When pA = pB = 0, the optimum is at  = 0; when there is
always one task of each type, each agent specializes in one type of task. However, as pA and
pB increase, the performance of specialization decreases in the state where the two projects
are dierent, because each agent must spend some time on the other type of task. Thus, the
division of labor is decreasing in pA and in pB.
A larger team would weaken the constraints in this optimization problem, allowing for
the sharing of type A tasks to vary independently of the sharing of type B tasks; i;A 6= i0;B.
Although each task type may support the work of two agents, a three agent team always
77dominates a team of four agents. When two agents share work on a task type, they must
share it equally. Therefore, if it is optimal for each task type to be shared, the same two
agents can share both task types.
Three agents perform better than two only when s = 0 is optimal for one of the task
types but not the other. In this case, the time constraints cannot be satised with only two
agents. One agent is required to work on a project of type A (for example) whenever such
a project is available, but two agents should share the single B type project when there is
one of each type. With only two agents, one agent would be required to work on one and a
half projects with probability (1   pA   pB).
While the distribution over the number of projects for each task may be such that
the optimal team size is two agents, combining these task types so one team works on both
types is at least as ecient because an agent on team A can work on a type B task when
he is not working on a type A task. Because the quantity of dierent task types do not
uctuate together, job sharing is possible, and job sharing allows for the same output to be
achieved with a smaller number of agents.
This argument elucidates the role of a constant project limit in demonstrating the
optimality of job sharing in this example. The next section discusses optimal job sharing
when the volume of dierent task types can vary freely. First, a brief illustration will show
that the job sharing with constant project limit result does not depend on a nite number
of task types.
Consider a team of n agents, and assume that the number of projects in a unit of
time is also n. Suppose all n projects in a given period are identical, but projects may be
distributed over the set of task types, 
 = [0;1], in a number of ways. Specically, assume
78that there is a probability p that the tasks in each project are distributed uniformly, and
there is a (1   p) probability that half of the task types are twice as likely as the rest (as
in Section 3.4.1) and that every possible subset S  
 with jSj = 1
2 can be weighted this
way. (The particular probability distribution over potential projects is not essential to this
illustration.)
As outlined in Section 3.3.1, the optimal division of labor when the project's distri-
bution over tasks is uniform is a partition of 
 = [0;1] into n equal sized subsets. In some
states this division of labor is not feasible because if agents are limited to working only on
tasks inside this specialty, the time constraint of some agents will be violated|they will not
be able to complete all tasks in their specialty.
In particular, there will be some state in which all of agent i's tasks are given higher
weight. Recalling the distribution
f(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2
3 if s 62 S
4
3 if s 2 S
Agent i's segment of task types will require
n
4
3
1
n
> 1
units of time to complete. Thus, no partition of 
 into n equal subsets is a feasible division
of labor in this case. In fact, no partition of 
 into n sets is feasible. Instead, 
 can
be partitioned into n
2 subsets, with each subset being shared by two agents. Then for
79any realization of the task type distribution, there will be a sucient number of agents to
complete each task type when agents only work on tasks within their specialization. In
this case, agents are less specialized, and labor is less divided. As the volatility of project
distributions increases (i.e. the maximum volume of each task type increases), the division
of labor decreases|more agents share a specialization.
When the volume of a particular task type uctuates, more agents will be required
to work on that type of task in some states than are required in other states. Then, there
is a positive probability that an additional agent will spend some time working on that
task type. Maximizing gains from practice for one agent comes at the cost of less procient
agents sometimes working on that type of task. Reducing the division of labor, by creating
overlapping jobs, allows all agents who work on a particular type of task to do so with a
moderate level of prociency. When there is a suciently high probability of there being
excess tasks, a team of moderate prociency agents will perform better than a team with
some experts and some novices.
3.5 Job and Team Design: Varying Task Type and
Project Quantity
The assumptions used in the previous sections have required that task types be related to
each other in particular ways, either always co-occurring because there is a xed task type
distribution (Section 3.3) or being negatively correlated because there is a xed project limit
(Section 3.4). In some industries the availability of dierent task types may be related in
80other ways (or may even be independent). This section uses a simple example of the model
to discuss the impact of weakening the assumptions used above on optimal job design and
team size.
Suppose that there are four task types (
 = fA;B;C;Dg), and that each project
consists entirely of a single task type. Further suppose that for each task type, in a unit of
time, up to one project may be available; let ps be the probability that a project of type s
is available. Finally, suppose there is a value to leisure that is !. Then if the assignment of
agents to tasks is done for each type individually, an agent would be assigned to task type
s when psE(ps)  !.
The optimal overall job design and team size depend on the joint distribution of
project availability. To illustrate the relationship between distribution and optimal team
design, the xed task type and the xed project limit distribution examples of this setup
will be considered before discussing more general distributions.
3.5.1 Fixed Task Type Distribution
Suppose that Pr[s0 j ^ s] = 1 for all s0 and ^ s 2 
; task types are co-occurring. There is a xed
distribution over task types; namely, in each state, each task type represents a quarter of all
projects. It must be that ps = p for all s 2 
 and that there are always either four projects
or none.
In this case, the team size is the sum of the individually optimal teams. If and only
if p^ sE(p^ s)  ! for some ^ s 2 
, psE(ps)  ! for all s 2 
. Optimally, there is no job overlap
in this case because if two agents share two task types, the performance on those task type's
81projects decreases. Thus, the optimal combined team for all task types has the same size
and job design as the optimal separate teams for each task type.
3.5.2 Fixed Project Limit with Negative Correlation
At the other extreme, assume that there is always one project, so that Pr[s0 j ^ s] = 0 for each
s0; ^ s 2 
. Then one agent always does at least as well as a larger team, because maximum
production of a task type s is psE(ps), and one agent can achieve this level of production
for all task types. Thus, rather than separating dierent task types, it is always better to
combine them into a single team; division of labor is at a minimum.
Note that if it is optimal for an individual task type to be done separately, then that
task type will be done in the combined team: If ps0E(ps0)  ! for some s0, then
P
s
psE(ps) 
!. In addition, some task types that would not be done individually may be done in the
combined team because spare time can be used for tasks that are not frequent enough to
command their own team. Thus, the combined team never does worse than individual teams,
and it performs strictly better than individual teams whenever
P
s
psE(ps)  !, because more
projects are done, sometimes with fewer agents.
3.5.3 Illustration of Other Distributions
In general the number of projects available could be anywhere between zero and four. Sup-
pose the probability of two projects being available is near one, and that each combination
of two projects is equally likely.
82Consider a team of two agents. This team must have some job overlap because for
any two mutually exclusive subsets of 
, there is some probability that the two available task
types are in one of those subsets. Thus, there is at least one task type for which two agents
share responsibility, and the performance of this task type could be increased by assigning
all projects of this type to a single agent. Increasing prociency in this way can only be
achieved by increasing the team size. With a team of four agents, for example, each project
could be done with maximum productivity, psE(ps).
Suppose that there are never more than two projects. Then increasing the team
size above two does not increase the number of projects that are done. Thus, when the
probability of three or four projects is suciently low, increasing the team size increases the
productivity with which projects are done, but it decreases the utilization of agent time.
That is, each task type can become more specialized because an agent is able to spend more
of his time on only that task type, but the agent also spends more time idle, as he does not
use his spare time to work on other types of tasks.
Thus there is a tradeo between specialization and eciency of agent time. Division
of labor and specialization are increased by increasing the number of agents. However,
under limited workow and uncertainty over task types, the gains from adding agents to
the team are constrained because the probability that an agent is idle increases and because
specialization is limited by the availability of tasks within a narrow eld.
833.6 Conclusion
The division of labor is a concept fundamental to the study of economics. It has important
implications across the economy, but especially for job and team design. Intuitively, the
particular way in which labor is divided should depend on the nature of the work being
done. However, the existing literature hasn't addressed the relationship between workow
and the division of labor.
During the last century, production in post-industrial economies has shifted away
from manufacturing industries towards service and technology industries. The workow in
these industries diers greatly from that in manufacturing, implying observed patterns in
the division of labor should be expected to change. In order to better understand these
changes, our theories must be adapted to reect non-manufacturing industries.
The model presented in this paper illustrates the impact of uncertain workows on
job and team design. It shows that prociency from specialization may be limited by the
availability of tasks. In addition, as uncertainty over the distribution of task types increases,
specialization and the division of labor both decrease, because the ability to move agents
between dierent types of tasks becomes more important. Finally, uncertain workload can
lead to an increase in team size; this increase in size may allow for a greater division of labor,
but can also result in decreased agent utilization.
In addition to elucidating the relationship between shifts in the economy and changes
in division of labor, job design, and team design, this model has cross-sectional implications.
It suggests that dierences in division of labor and specialization across industries may be
attributable to dierences in the nature and uncertainty of the work in those industries.
84Furthermore, it indicates that within an industry, some tasks are more likely to be shared
among groups than others; therefore, some tasks will have a lower degree of specialization
than others. In this way it connects dierences in job design and specialization (for ex-
ample between faculty and administrators) with dierences in the nature of work (research
generation versus service provision).
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88Appendix to Chapter 1
Equilibrium Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Two Period Equilibruim
Proposition 1. Under Condition 1 all mismatched agents with non-urgent tasks are reas-
signed in Period 1.
Let   be the fraction of agents who are high skill and reassigned in Period 1, and let
 be the fraction of agents who are low skill and reassigned in Period 1.
Lemma 1. The surplus from work on non-urgent tasks in Period 2 is weakly increasing in
the fraction of reassigned agents.
Proof. If no agents are reassigned in Period 1, ^ p high skill and (1   ^ p) low skill agent are
allocated ex-ante to rms for work in Period 2. After tasks arrive in Period 2, ^ p(1 ^ )(1  ^ p)
high skill agents will have received non-urgent, high value tasks. Similarly, (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p
low skill agents will have received non-urgent low value tasks. All other non-urgent tasks are
eciently matched with agents. For each non-urgent, high value task without a high skill
agent, there is a high skill agent with a non-urgent low value task, and by rematching these
89two agents, surplus can be increased by
(    )( v   v) > 0
If a high skill agent is reassigned during Period 1, then he is unassigned when Period 2 starts,
as he worked instead of preparing during the second half of Period 1. Assigning these agents
to non-urgent high value tasks generates more surplus than reassigning a high skill agent
from a low value task.
(    ) v > (    ) v    v
Thus, for each reassigned high skill agent, the fraction of tasks that are non-urgent and high
value at rms without high skill agents is increasing at the marginal rate of
(1   ^ )^ p
but the fraction of agents who are high skill and unassigned increases at the marginal rate
of 1, thus, the marginal change in non-urgent, high value tasks available to rematch with
assigned high skill agents is
(1   ^ )^ p   1 < 0
Thus, all non-urgent, high value tasks will be done by high skill agents regardless of the
fraction of agents who are reassigned.
90Furthermore, the fraction of agents who are high skill with non-urgent, low value
tasks and who are not reassigned in Period 2 is
^ p   (^ p    )^    (1   ^ )^ p =  ^ 
For an increase in reassigned high skill agents, there is a corresponding marginal increase of
^  in the fraction of tasks that are non-urgent, low value and done by high skill agents.
Corollary 1. Following from Lemma 1, reassigning an agent of skill level  during Period
1 decreases surplus in Period 2 by a maximum of
^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
Each reassigned agent corresponds to a rm that is unmatched ex-ante of Period 2.
This rm's urgent task will not be done, but would have generated ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] if the
reassigned agent had been available.
Proof of Proposition. For each reassigned high skill agent, reassigning a low skill agent to
the non-urgent task at his rm leads to a change in surplus of
v   ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
which is positive when Condition 1 a) holds. Thus, each low value agent at a rm with a
non-urgent, high value tasks is reallocated to a rm with a non-urgent, low value task.
91Thus, for each reassigned high skill agent, a low skill will also be reassigned. This
generates a marginal surplus in Period 1 of
(    )( v   v)
Then the net total surplus change from reassigning this agent is
(    )( v   v)   (  + )^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
which is positive when Condition 1 b) holds. Thus, each high skill agent at a rm with a
non-urgent, low value task is reassigned to a non-urgent, high value task.
Convergence
Lemma 2. Once a high skill agent is reassigned, there will be a non-urgent, high value task
for him to work on during each subsequent period.
Proof. Suppose  t high skill agents have been reassigned before period t begins. Further,
suppose that  t 1 high skill agents were not allocated ex-ante of t   1. It must be that  t,
the number of agents reassigned before t, is less than the number of non-urgent, high value
tasks without an ex-ante assigned high skill agent in period t   1
 t  [1   (^ p    t 1)](1   ^ )^ p (1)
92Otherwise, an agent would have no task to do in Period t 1 and could be allocated ex-ante
for Period t.
The fraction of tasks that are non-urgent, high value and not matched with a high
skill ex-ante assigned agent in Period t is
[1   (^ p    t)](1   ^ )^ p
So the condition that there are non-urgent high value tasks for all unassigned high skill
agents to do in Period t is
 t  [1   (^ p    t)](1   ^ )^ p
 t[1   (1   ^ )^ p]  (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p (2)
From Equation 1 we have
 t[1   (1   ^ )^ p]  [1   (^ p    t 1)](1   ^ )^ p[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
 (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
< (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p
Therefore, Inequality 2 must hold when Equation 1 holds, and there must be a sucient
number of tasks for all reassigned high skill agents to work on.
93Observation. Each period for which the number of high skill agents not assigned ex-ante,
 , satises the following condition, there will be an opportunity for surplus increase from
ex-post reassignment.
 [1   (1   ^ )^ p] < (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p
If this inequality is satised, then in this period, there are strictly more non-urgent,
high value tasks not assigned a high skill agent ex-ante than there are unassigned high skill
agents.
Proposition 2. If the economy lasts for n periods, then for all v satisfying Condition 1,
there is a  such that:
During each period, any ex-ante assigned agents that can be reassigned for an imme-
diate surplus increase will be.
Proof. Following from Proposition 1, it must be that in the second to the last period n   1,
any agents that can be reassigned will be. Then, in n   2, any reassignment will have no
eect on surplus from work on non-urgent tasks in the following two periods. However, it
will introduce a cost of urgent tasks that go undone each of the last two periods. Given the
discount rate, , the net change in surplus from reallocating a high skill agent in period n 2
is
v   (   
2)^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
v   ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] > 0
94Therefore, if there is a non-urgent, high value task without a high skill agent, reassigning a
high skill agent from a low value task will increase surplus.
Using backward induction, the net surplus from reassignment of a high skill agent in
Period n   t is
v  
t X
1

t^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
=v  

1   
^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] (3)
>v   ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] > 0 (4)
The inequality holds between lines (3) and (4) for any  < 1
2.
For high skill agents, then the net increase in surplus from reassignment in n   2 is
(    )( v   v)   (   
2) ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
>(    )( v   v)    ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] > 0
Therefore, if there is a non-urgent, high value task without a high skill agent, reassigning a
high skill agent from a low value task will increase surplus.
95Using backward induction, the net surplus from reassignment of a high skill agent in
Period n   t is
(    )( v   v)  
t X
1

t ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]
=(    )( v   v)  

1   
 ^ [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v] > 0
Thus, in each period for which there is an opportunity to reassign agents in a (same
period) surplus increasing way, those agents will be reassigned.
Comparative Statics Proofs
Proposition. Under Condition 1, as the number of periods approaches innity, the assign-
ment of agents converges to the following:
• The number of high skill agents are allocated ex-post is
 
 =
(1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
• ^ p     high skill agents are allocated ex-ante
• The number of low skill agents allocated ex-post is

 =
(1   ^ p)2(1   ^ )2^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p][1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]
96• (1   ^ p   ) low skill agents are allocated ex-ante
Proof. For each period in which  t < (1    t)(1   ^ )^ p, it must be that
 t+1 = (1    t)(1   ^ )^ p >  t
Thus,  t is increasing but bounded above by
 
 =
(1   ^ p)(1   ^ )^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
So the number of high skill contractors approaches a steady state in which it is equal to  .
The number of low skill contractors is the number of non-urgent, low value tasks at rms
without an employee, giving the expression for .
Varying High Skill Labor Supply
Let  be the total number of high skill agents, and suppose that  < ^ p.
Observation. When  < ^ p, the number of high skill agents allocated ex-post is
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
and the number of low skill agents allocated ex-post is

 =
^ p(1   ^ p)(1   ^ )2(1   )
[1   (1   ^ )^ p][1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]
97Ex-Ante Identical Firms
Numbers of Contractors
Proposition 3. The fractions of agents who are high and low skill contractors (are hired
ex-post) is decreasing in urgency.
@ 
@^ 
< 0
and
@
@^ 
< 0
Proof. The fraction of agents who are high skill contractors is
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
@ 
@^ 
=
 [1   (1   ^ )^ p](1   ^ )^ p(1   )   (1   )(1   ^ )^ p2
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]2 < 0
As the number of high skill agents is constant, the number of high skill employees is     ,
it must be that the number of high skill employees is increasing in urgency, ^ .
The fraction of agents who are low skill contractors is

 =
^ p(1   ^ p)(1   ^ )2(1   )
[1   (1   ^ )^ p][1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]
@
@^ 
=
 [1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)][ (1   ^ p)   (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )
@ 
@^  ]    (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)2
[1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]2 < 0
98As the number of low skill agents is constant, the number of low skill employees is (1  ),
we have that the number of high skill employees is increasing in urgency, ^ .
Proposition 5. The quantity of high and low skill contractors are decreasing in high skill
labor supply.
@ 
@
< 0
and
@
@
< 0
Proof. The fraction of agents who are high skill contractors is
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )^ p
[1   (1   ^ )^ p]
@
@
=
 (1   ^ )^ p
1   (1   ^ ^ p]
< 0
So the quantity of high skill contractors is decreasing as the quantity of high skill agents
increases.
The fraction of agents who are low skill contractors is

 =
 (1   ^ p)(1   ^ )
[1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]
@
@
=
@ 
@
(1   ^ p)(1   ^ )
[1   (1   ^ )(1   ^ p)]
< 0
99So the quantity of low skill contractors is also decreasing in high skill labor supply.
Division of Labor
Dene the division of labor as the fraction of tasks that are matched assortatively (high value
with high skill agents and low value with low skill agents). Recalling that ex-post allocated
agents are always matched assortatively, this fraction can be written:
 
 + (    
)^ p + 
 + (1      
)(1   ^ p)
Proposition 6. The division of labor is decreasing in urgency.
Proof. The division of labor is
 
 + (    
)^ p + 
 + (1      
)(1   ^ p)
The derivative with respect to urgency is
@ 
@^ 
(1   ^ p) +
@
@^ 
^ p < 0
The inequality holds by Proposition 4 (
@ 
@^  < 0 and
@
@^  < 0).
Proposition 7. The division of labor is decreasing in the supply of high skill labor.
100Proof. The division of labor is
 
 + (    
)^ p + 
 + (1      
)(1   ^ p)
which can be written
 
(1   ^ p) + 
^ p + ^ p + (1   )(1   ^ p)
The derivative with respect to  is
@ 
@
(1   ^ p) +
@
@
^ p + (2^ p   1) < 0
The inequality holds by Proposition 5 (
@ 
@ < 0 and
@
@ < 0) and ^ p < 1
2.
Wages: Levels and Inequality
Let w() be the wage of agent type . The prots of rms following each of the employment
policies are as follows:
  =  [^ p v + (1   ^ p)v]   w( )
 = [^ p^  v + (1   ^ p)v]   w() + ^ p(1   ^ )[  v   w( )]
wait = (1   ^ )[^ p(  v   w( )) + (1   ^ p)(v   w())]
101The indierence of rms between hiring a low skill agent and waiting to hire an agent,
wait = , determines the wage of the low skill agent.
w() = v

rv
[^ p + (1   ^ p)rv]
[^ p + (1   ^ p)]
The indierence of rms between hiring a high skill agent and waiting to hire an agent,
  = wait determines the wage of the high skill agent.
w( ) =   v

^ p + (1   ^ p)[1   (1   )rv]
[1   ^ p(1   )]

+
(1   )(1   ^ p)
[1   ^ p(1   )]
w()
A rm of type p, the highest type rm to hire a low skill agent ex-ante, will be
indierent between this policy and waiting to hire ex-post. This indierence will determine
the wage for the low skill agent.
w() = v

rv
[p + (1   p)rv]
[p + (1   p)]
A rm of type p, the lowest type rm to hire a high skill agent ex-ante, will be indierent
between hiring a high skill agent and waiting to hire ex-post.
w( ) =   v

p + (1   p)[1   (1   )rv]
[1   p(1   )]

+
(1   )(1   p)
[1   p(1   )]
w()
In an economy with ex-ante dierent rms, high skill agents are allocated to higher produc-
tivity rms. This eect increases inequality in the wages of high and low skill agents.
102A rm of type p, the highest type rm to hire a low skill agent ex-ante, will be
indierent between this policy and waiting to hire ex-post. This indierence will determine
the wage for the low skill agent.
w() = v

rv
[p + (1   p)rv]
[p + (1   p)]
A rm of type p, the lowest type rm to hire a high skill agent ex-ante, will be indierent
between hiring a high skill agent and waiting to hire ex-post.
w( ) =   v

p + (1   p)[1   (1   )]rv
[1   p(1   )]

+
(1   )(1   p)
[1   p(1   )]
w()
In an economy with ex-ante dierent rms, high skill agents are allocated to higher produc-
tivity rms. This eect increases inequality in the wages of high and low skill agents.
Two Types of Firms
In this subsection, the assumption that all rms are ex-ante identical is relaxed. Let there
be two types of rms, one type has an ex-ante p > 1
2 probability of receiving a high value
task, and the other has an ex-ante (1   p) probability of receiving a high value task. Of all
rms,  are the high type, with p > 1
2 probability of a high value task. The fraction of tasks
that are high value is ^ p = p + (1   p)(1   ).
In addition to the variables discussed in the previous subsection, this section will
examine the types of rms are not matched with agents ex-ante as well as how uncertainty
impacts the number of contractors, the division of labor, and wages.
103Holding the number of high value tasks, ^ p, constant, uncertainty is increasing as p
decreases. When p is close to 1, rm type is a good indicator for task type, making it easier
to assign high skill agents to high value tasks. However, as p decreases, there is less certainty
over the location of high value tasks ex-ante.
Note that as p changes,  also changes. Rewriting ^ p = p + (1   p)(1   ) gives:
 =
^ p   (1   p)
2p   1
Then,  is decreasing as p decreases (uncertainty increases), and  2 [0; ^ p).
Ex-ante assigned agents will be assertively matched with rms. High skill agents
assigned ex-ante will rst be assigned to high probability (p) rms. If there are more such
agents than such rms, some ex-ante assigned, high skill agents will be allocated to low
probability (1   p) rms. Similarly, low skill agents assigned ex-ante will rst be assigned
to low probability rms. Low skill agents assigned ex-ante will only be allocated to high
probability rms if there is an excess of these agents.
There are three cases for the ex-ante assignment of agents:
Case 1:  >  +  >     
There are fewer high skill agents assigned ex-ante than there are high probability
rms, and there are more low skill agents assigned ex-ante than there are low probability
rms. High skill, ex-ante assigned agents work for high probability rms. Low skill, ex-ante
agents work for low and high probability rms. All ex-post assigned agents work for high
probability rms.
104 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )

 =
 (1   p)(1   ^ )
1   (1   p)(1   ^ )
Case 2:  +  >  >     
There are fewer high skill agents than there are high probability rms, and there
are fewer low skill agents than there are low probability rms. High skill, ex-ante assigned
agents work for high probability rms. Low skill, ex-ante agents work for low probability
rms. Ex-post assigned agents work for high and low probability rms.
 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )

 =
(1   ^ )[(1   ^ p)   (    )(1   p)   (1   )p]
1   (1   ^ )p
Case 3:  +  >      > 
There are more high skill agents than high probability rms. High skill, ex-ante
assigned agents work for high probability and low probability rms. All ex-post assigned
and low skill, ex-ante assigned agents work for low probability rms.
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)
1   (1   ^ )(1   p)

 =
 (1   ^ )p
1   p(1   ^ )
105Number of Contractors
Proposition 3. The quantities of contractors are decreasing in urgency.
Proof. First consider  . In Cases 1 and 2,
 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
and
@ 
@^ 
=
 [1   p(1   ^ )](^ p   p)   p[^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2 < 0
In Case 3
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)
1   (1   ^ )(1   p)
and
@ 
@^ 
=
 [1   (1   ^ )(1   p)][(1   )(1   p)]   [(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)](1   p)
[1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]2 < 0
Next consider . In Case 1,

 =
 (1   p)(1   ^ )
1   (1   p)(1   ^ )
106and
@
@^ 
=
@ 
@^ 
(1   p)(1   ^ )
1   (1   p)(1   ^ )
 
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )] (1   p)   [ (1   p)(1   ^ )](1   p)
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
<0
In Case 2,

 =
(1   ^ )[(1   ^ p)   (    )(1   p)   (1   )p]
1   (1   ^ )p
and
@
@^ 
=
@ 
@^ 
(1   p)(1   ^ )[1   (1   ^ )p]
[1   (1   ^ p]2  
(1   ^ p) + (    )(2p   1) +  p
[1   (1   ^ )p]
 
(1   ^ )[(1   ^ p) + (    )(2p   1) +  p]
[1   (1   ^ p]2
< 0
Finally, in Case 3,

 =
 (1   ^ )p
1   p(1   ^ )
and
@
@^ 
=
@ 
@^ 
p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
 
[1   p(1   ^ )] p   [ p(1   ^ )]p
[1   p(1   ^ )]2 < 0
107Proposition 4. The fractions of high and low skill agents who become contractors (are hired
ex-post) is increasing in uncertainty.
Proof. First consider  . In Cases 1 and 2,
 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
and
@ 
@p
=
 [1   p(1   ^ )](1   ^ ) + [^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )](1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
=
 (1   ^ ) + ^ p(1   ^ )2
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
 0
The inequality holds because  2 ((1   ^ )^ p; ^ p).
In Case 3,
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)
1   (1   ^ )(1   p)
and
@ 
@p
=
 [1   (1   ^ )(1   p)](1   )(1   ^ )   [(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)](1   ^ )
[1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]2 < 0
Next, consider . In Case 1,

 =
 (1   p)(1   ^ )
1   (1   p)(1   ^ )
108and
@
@p
=  
  [[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )](1   ^ ) + [(1   p)(1   ^ )](1   ^ )]
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2 +
@ 
@p
(1   p)(1   ^ )
1   (1   p)(1   ^ )
<0
In Case 2,

 =
(1   ^ )[(1   ^ p)   (    )(1   p)   (1   )p]
1   (1   ^ )p
and
@
@p
=
[1   (1   ^ )p](1   ^ )[2   1     +
@ 
@p (1   p)]
[1   (1   ^ )p]2
+
(1   ^ )2[(1   ^ p)   (    )(1   p)   (1   )p]
[1   (1   ^ )p]2
=
[1   (1   ^ )p](1   ^ )(2   1)   2(1   ^ )2(1   p)    (1   ^ )2p(1    )
[1   (1   ^ )p]2
+
(1   ^ )2[(    )   [^ p   (1   p)]]
[1   (1   ^ )p]2
<0
In Case 3,

 =
 (1   ^ )p
1   p(1   ^ )
109and
@
@p
=
  [[1   p(1   ^ )](1   ^ ) + (1   ^ )2p]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2 +
@ 
@p
 (1   ^ )p
1   p(1   ^ )
=  


(1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]2  
(1   ^ )p
(1   p)[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]

=  


(1   ^ )(1   p)[1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]   (1   ^ )p[1   p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2(1   p)[1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]

=  


(1   ^ )^ (1   2p)
[1   p(1   ^ )]2(1   p)[1   (1   ^ )(1   p)]

 0
The inequality holds because p > 1
2.
Proposition 5. The quantity of high skill contractors is decreasing in high skill labor supply.
Proof. First consider   In Cases 1 and 2
 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
and
@ 
@
=  
p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
< 0
In Case 3
 
 =
(1   )(1   ^ )(1   p)
1   (1   ^ )(1   p)
and
@ 
@
=  
(1   ^ )(1   p)
1   (1   ^ )(1   p)
< 0
110Division of Labor
Recall that for ex-ante identical rms, the division of labor is
(    
)^ p +  
 + (1      
)(1   ^ p) + 

The function for the division of labor under the assumption that there are two types of rms
depends on the value of , the fraction of rms with a high probability of a high value task.
minf(    
);gp + maxf0;(    
)   g(1   p) +  

+minf(1      
);(1   )gp + maxf0;(1      
)   (1   )g(1   p) + 

Case 1:  >  +  >     
(    
)p +  
 + (1   )p + [(1      
)   (1   )](1   p) + 

(   )(2p   1) +  
(1   p) + (1 + 
)p
Case 2:  +  >  >     
(    
)p +  
 + (1      
)p + 

(1    
   
)p + 
 +  

111Case 3:  +  >      > 
p + (    
   )(1   p) +  
 + [(1      
)]p + 

(2p   1) + (    
)(1   p) +  
 + (1      
)p + 

Proposition 6. The division of labor is decreasing in urgency.
Proof. Case 1:  >  +  >     
(1    
   
)p + 
 +  

The derivative is

@ 
@^ 
+
@
@^ 

(1   p) < 0
Case 2:  +  >  >     
(   )(2p   1) +  
(1   p) + (1 + 
)p
The derivative is
@ 
@^ 
(1   p) +
@
@^ 
p < 0
Case 3:  +  >      > 
(2p   1) + (    
)(1   p) +  
 + (1      
)p + 

112The derivative is
@ 
@^ 
p +
@
@^ 
(1   p) < 0
Lemma 3. If
 
 =
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
1   p(1   ^ )
(as in Cases 1 and 2) then
(    
) +
@ 
@p
(1   p) > 0
Proof.
(    
) +
@ 
@p
(1   p)
=  
^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]
  (1   p)
[1   p(1   ^ )](1   ^ )   (1   ^ )[^ p(1   ^ )   p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
=
   p(1   ^ )   ^ p(1   ^ ) + p^ p(1   ^ )2   (1   p)(1   ^ ) + ^ p(1   p)(1   ^ )2
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
=
^ [   ^ p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
>0
Proposition 8. The division of labor is decreasing in uncertainty.
113Proof. Recall that as p increases, uncertainty decreases. Thus, we need to show that the
derivatives are positive for the proof. Case 1:  >  +  >     
(1    
   
)p + 
 +  

The derivative is

(    
) +
@ 
@p
(1   p)

+

 + 
 +
@
@p
p

> 0
Both terms are positive: the rst by Lemma 3, the second as follows:
 + 
 +
@
@p
p
=
^  + ^ p(1   p)(1   ^ )2
[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
 
(1   p)(1   ^ )[^ p(1   ^ mu)   p(1   ^ )]
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
 
(1   p)2(1   ^ )2[   ^ p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
=
^ [1   (1   ^ )[p + (1   p)2]] + ^ 2(1   p)
[1   p(1   ^ )]2[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
 
(1   p)2(1   ^ )2[(1   ^ )   ^ p(1   ^ )]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
+
(1   p)(1   ^ )[p(1   ^ )]
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2 +
^ p(1   p)(1   ^ )3(2p   1)
[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
>0
Case 2:  +  >  >     
(   )(2p   1) +  
(1   p) + (1 + 
)p
114The derivative is

(    
) +
@ 
@p
(1   p)

+

(1      
) +
@
@p
(1   p)

> 0
Both terms are positive: the rst by Lemma 3, the second as follows:
(1      
) +
@
@p
(1   p)
=(1   )  
(1   ^ )(1   p)   (1   )p(1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]
+(1   p)
@ 
@p

(1   ^ )(1   p)   (1   )p(1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]

+

(    
) +
@ 
@p
(1   p)

(1   p)(1   ^ )
[1   p(1   ^ )]
+(    
)
1   (1   ^ )2
[1   p(1   ^ )]2
> 0
Case 3:  +  >      > 
(2p   1) + (    
)(1   p) +  
 + (1      
)p + 

The derivative is

1   (    
) +
@ 
@p
p

+

(1      
) +
@
@p
(1   p)

> 0
115The rst term is positive:
1   (    
) +
@ 
@p
p
=
(1   )
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
 
p(1   )(1   ^ )
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
=
(1   )^ 
[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
The second term is also positive:
(1      
) +
@
@p
(1   p)
=
^ (1   )
[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
+
(1   )(1   ^ )2(1   p)2
[1   p(1   ^ )]2[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]
 
(1   )(1   ^ )2p(1   p)
[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
=
(1   )^ [[1   (1   ^ )[(1   p) + p(1   p)(1   ^ )]]
[1   p(1   ^ )][1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
+
(1   )(1   ^ )2(1   p)[[1   (1   ^ )[p + (1   p)2]] + (1   ^ )2p2]
[1   p(1   ^ )]2[1   (1   p)(1   ^ )]2
>0
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Condition 1. A necessary condition for a candidate allocation of agents to be an equilibrium
is that for any i and i0 with i0 < i, it must be that [qi;H v + qi;Lv]  [qi0;H v + qi0;Lv].
Proof. Holding all jobs constant, suppose there is an i0 < i with [qi;H v + qi;Lv] < [qi0;H v +
qi0;Lv]. Then without changing any other assignment, switching the jobs of these two agents
changes output by
(i0   i)[qi;H v + qi;Lv] + (i   i0)[qi0;H v + qi0;Lv]
= (i   i0)([qi0;H v + qi0;Lv]   [qi;H v + qi;Lv]) > 0
Lemma 1. For each realization of the random variables, unemployed agents are less skilled
than contractors in the following sense:
If agent i is unemployed, no agent with i0 < i can be employed as a contractor.
Proof. Follows directly from Condition 1: Suppose agent i0 < i is employed as a contractor.
Then [qi0;H v + qi0;Lv]  [qi;H v + qi;Lv] = 0, violating Condition 1.
Lemma 2. There are only unemployed agents if each rm with a general task hires an agent.
117Proof. If agent i is unemployed and rm j receives a general task with value vj but has not
hired an agent, surplus is increased by ivj when j hires i ex-post.
Lemma 3. Firm j can only agent i as an independent contractor if the following 2 conditions
hold:
1. Firm j received a general task.
2. No agent with i0 < i is an employee of rm j.
Proof. Part 1) If rm j does not have a general tasks, then i with general knowledge cannot
produce any value at that rm.
Part 2) If rm j has hired i0 > i as an employee, then i0 can only produce value at
rm j (that value is i0vj). If j hires i ex-post to do this task instead then the change in
surplus is (i   i0)vj < 0.
Claim 1. If i is a contractor who prefers a job as an employee, then all i0 < i are contractors.
Proof. There cannot be an employee who is of lower skill (that rm would be willing to
hire i and get higher productivity...). If there aren't any lower skill employees, then there
must be rms that have not hired an agent as an employee (otherwise i could not work as
a contractor). But if there are rms that have not hired an employee, then there cannot be
any agents (of lower or of high skill) who are unemployed (in every state). Thus, no lower
skill agent can be an employee, and no lower skill agent can be unemployed. All less skilled
agents must also be contractors.
If there is an i0 < i who is an employee, then [qi;H v + qi;Lv] > [qi0;H v + qi0;Lv], with
qi;V ;qi0;V > 0. If there is an i0 < i who is unemployed, then
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Proof of Condition for Increasing Team Size
Let G be a distribution over the number of projects available. Let Gr+1 be a mean preserving
spread of Gr and let nr and nr+1 be the optimal team sizes for distributions Gr and Gr+1
respectively.
Claim 1. There is a probability (1 G
r) 2

(1   Gr(nr));(1   Gr(nr))
1
1+

such that nr+1 
nr if and only if
(1   Gr+1(nr))  (1   G

r) (1)
Recall that if an interior solution to the optimization problem exists, nr+1 > nr when
(1+)
Z nr
0
1   Gr+1(x)dx

(1 Gr+1(nr)) > (1+)
Z nr
0
1   Gr(x)dx

(1 Gr(nr)) (2)
By denition, if G2 is a mean preserving spread of G1, then
Z n
0
G2(x)dx 
Z n
0
G1(x)dx
119for all n and
Z 1
0
1   G2(x)dx =
Z 1
0
1   G1(x)dx = E[x]
Then inequality (2) can only be satised when (1   Gr+1(nr)) > (1   Gr(nr)).
Because (1   G(x)) 2 (0;1] is decreasing,
(1   G(n))n >
Z n
0
1   G(x)dx

(1   G(n)) > (1   G(n))
1+n
for all n and all G. Thus, if (1   Gr+1(nr))1+ = (1   Gr(nr)),
Z nr
0
1   Gr+1(x)dx

(1   Gr+1(nr)) >
(1   Gr+1(nr))
1+nr = (1   Gr(nr))nr
>
Z nr
0
1   Gr(x)dx

(1   Gr(nr))
Thus, Inequality 2 holds at (1   Gr+1(nr)) = (1   Gr(nr))
1
1+. Then there is a (1   G
r) <
(1   Gr(nr))
1
1+ such that if (1   Gr+1(nr)) = (1   G
r) the inequality holds with equal-
ity. Then whenever (1   Gr+1(nr))  (1   G
r) the inequality must hold. Because the
inequality cannot hold for (1   Gr(nr)) = (1   Gr(nr)), it must be that (1   G
r) 2

(1   Gr(nr));(1   Gr(nr))
1
1+

.
120Two Period Example
This section considers job design under uncertainty over task type distribution in the short-
run. Consider a two period model in which agents accrue prociency only after completing
work. Then agents work to accrue skill in the rst period, and work to produce output in
the second period.
Following the example given in Section 3.4.2: Suppose that there are two task types,

 = fA;Bg. Further suppose that the number of projects is limited, but there are two
projects with certainty. Finally, suppose that each project consists entirely of one of the task
types. There is a probability, pA of there being two projects of type A tasks, a probability
pB of there being two projects of type B tasks and a (1 pA pB) of there being one project
of each type.
Job design is only relevant when there is one project of each type in the rst period.
Each project could be assigned to one agent, in which case Period 2 output would be:
pA[E(1) + E(0)]
+ (1   pA   pB)[E(1) + E(1)]
+ pB [E(0) + E(1)]
Alternatively, each project could be split between the two agents. Let  2 (0; 1
2] be
the smaller share of a project, noting that  when the team consists of two agents. In this
case, output is given by:
121pA[E(1   ) + E()]
+ (1   pA   pB)[E(1   ) + E(1   )]
+ pB [E() + E(1   )]
The derivative of this expression with respect to  is
(pA + pB)E
0()   (2   pA   pB)E
0(1   )
Because E is concave, E0()  E0(1   ) on the domain of . Then, for a suciently large
(pA+pB), the optimal  is positive, and the optimum goes to 1
2 as (pA+pB) goes to 1. When
the probability of there being excess tasks of a single type increases, it is more important
for both agents to have some prociency in each type of task.
The dierence between this example and the one given in the text is that here in
Period 2 when there is one project of each type, they are not shared between the agents.
Sharing tasks in the last period of a nite model decreases output because the minimum
prociency applied to each project decreases. There is also no benet to sharing the projects
because there are no future projects.
In a nite model with more periods, project sharing in intermediate periods will
contribute to agent's performance in subsequent periods, even though it decreases current
performance. These intermediate periods are similar, then, to the analysis in the text.
When there are more than two periods, project sharing in the rst period becomes even
122more valuable because it increases the performance on future shared projects. Taking this
added benet to its extreme, a very long time horizon, optimal task sharing must be  = 1
2,
as shown in the text.
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